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“There seems to me to be some possibility that these provisions 
may lead appellate courts into a machinery for striking down 
where striking down is needed . . . .”1 
Karl N. Llewellyn 
                                                                                                                     
 * Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law & Legal Studies, Chair, Department of 
Management, Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida; J.D., 
Cornell University; LL.M., Harvard Law School. 
 ** Doctoral Candidate, Department of Management, Warrington College of Business 
Administration, University of Florida; J.D., Louisiana State University; LL.M., University 
of Miami; M.B.A., University of Florida. 
 1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 369 
(1960). An alternative quote considered: “[I]t is essential that we address the problem 
which we caricature as the contract between the rabbits and foxes, in which the foxes im-
pose the clause that all disputes will be resolved by a panel of foxes, or by a panel of 
wolves.” Bd. of Ed. of Berkeley County v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439, 447 (W. 
Va. 1977). 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Karl Llewellyn2 saw section 2-302, the doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity, as providing a mandate for courts to police contracts.3 He did not 
see it as providing the machinery for accomplishing or guiding this 
grant of judical power.4 The doctrine of unconscionability and the 
best “machinery” for its implementation has been the source of schol-
arly discussion ever since.5 This Article attempts to provide empirical 
evidence, through the statistical analysis of cases, of how courts have 
applied this mandate and whether a discrete machinery has been de-
veloped in its implementation. Ultimately, the Article assesses 
whether a coherent machinery or analytical framework has been fab-
ricated through forty years of jurisprudence.6  
                                                                                                                     
 2. Karl Nickerson Llewellyn was the Chief Reporter for the Uniform Commercial 
Code (U.C.C.) and the principal drafter of Articles I (General Provisions) and II (Sales). He 
is also famous for his works in commercial and contract law, jurisprudence, legal educa-
tion, sociology and law, and anthropology and law. Llewellyn is most famous for his part in 
the U.C.C. project and as a principal of the Legal Realist Movement of the 1930s. 
 3. For a brief history of the U.C.C. project, see William A. Schnader, A Short History 
of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 
(1967). For a history of unconscionability as it pertains to the U.C.C. and its subsequent 
development in California, see Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need 
for Restraint and Certainty, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459 (1995). 
 4. Professor Murray expressed this view in his 1969 article: “Llewellyn completely 
understood . . . that the statute is nothing more than a catalyst for the development of the 
analytical structure of unconscionability.” John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Uncon-
scionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 38 (1969). 
 5. A Lexis search of the word “unconscionability,” limited to the most recent two 
years of legal literature, yielded 504 entries (search performed on Mar. 10, 2005). 
 6. In 1970, Robert Braucher, the principal author of section 2-302, stated that “we 
are probably not much more ready now than we were twenty years ago to arrive at com-
phrensive reasoned elaboration of what is unconscionable.” Robert Braucher, The Uncon-
scionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 347 (1970). A more recent article notes 
that “the judiciary has not been able to clearly delineate comprehensive rules.” Paul Ben-
nett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damage Clause: A Practical Applica-
tion of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 29 (2001). Some commentators 
have argued that the failure of the courts to fabricate a coherent analytical framework 
suggests that some form of further legislative or regulatory intervention through the use of 
mandatory terms is needed. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard 
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003). Professor Korobkin 
concludes that behavioral economics suggests that the best technique for policing the mar-
ket place for one-sided or unconscionable terms is a combination of legislative-mandated 
regulation through the use of mandatory terms and judicial oversight through the doctrine 
of unconscionability on a case-by-case basis: 
When the costs and benefits of particular terms are substantially similar across 
the range of contractual contexts in which the term will appear, legislatures 
and/or agencies mandating terms ex ante have a competitive advantage over 
courts; when costs and benefits are highly context specific, the advantage is re-
versed. In the latter circumstance, a judicial review process based upon a modi-
fied application of the unconscionability doctrine can improve upon the status 
quo and can be accomplished legitimately within the legislated boundaries of 
that doctrine. 
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 This Article provides the findings of an empirical study of 187 
court cases (case coding project) in which the issue of the unconscion-
ability of a contract or a contract term was addressed by the courts. 
The cases were drawn from two time periods. The first set of cases 
can be viewed as the first generation of Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.)-style7 unconscionability cases from 1968-1980.8 The second 
generation of unconscionability cases were from the time period of 
1991-2003. The two groups of cases allow us to not only analyze a se-
ries of questions and factors, but also to make intergenerational or 
longitudinal observations. The analysis is directed at answering four 
questions: (1) What are the standards used by courts in making un-
conscionability decisions?, (2) What type of evidence is considered by 
courts in making their decisions?, (3) What are the operative facts or 
factors that are most predictive of unconscionability decisions?, and 
(4) How do these findings inform us on the doctrine of unconscion-
ability both as to its reflection in the law (expressed doctrine) and in 
application (law in fact)?  
 Using actual court cases involving unconscionability claims, the 
purpose of this study is to empirically examine the effects of selected 
case characteristics on the outcomes of cases. Studies such as these 
have led Nagel and Neef9 to conclude that the empirical analysis of 
legal cases is useful for identifying variables that are predictive of 
case decisions. In developing a matrix of factors and variables to be 
studied, we reviewed the law of unconscionability, the extensive legal 
literature on the doctrine of unconscionability, and selected cases 
from the two different time frames discussed above. Part II provides 
a brief review of the law of unconscionability and analyzes some es-
                                                                                                                     
Id. at 1294; cf. Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths about Unconscionability: A New 
Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1981) (“[L]egislators cannot 
successfully draft legislation to encompass unforeseen circumstances.”). 
 7. U.C.C. §  2-302 (2005) states in its entirety: 
Unconscionable Contract or Clause: 
   (1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without 
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscion-
able clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
   (2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause 
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable op-
portunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to 
aid the court in making the determination. 
Id. 
 8. The U.C.C. was enacted in New York in 1963 and was quickly followed by other 
states. Therefore, the initial U.C.C. unconscionability cases began to reach a critical mass 
by the end of the 1960s. 
 9. STUART S. NAGEL  & MARIAN G. NEEF, DECISION THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 
(1979).  
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pecially illuminating judicial opinions. Part III examines the uncon-
scionability scholarship.  
 The analysis presented in Parts II and III serves two purposes. 
First, it allows for a better understanding of the issues, both practi-
cal and theoretical, that have been discussed in the debate over the 
role of unconscionability in a supposedly free contract law regime. 
Second, the generally-accepted, bifurcated analysis—procedural and 
substantive unconscionability—discussed in the literature10 and case 
law11 is mined to isolate factors perceived to be important to the un-
conscionability determination. Statistical analysis of the coded cases 
allowed us to measure the relative importance of substantive and 
procedural unconscionability. More specifically, it allowed for the 
weighing of the relative importance of factors, both procedurally and 
substantively related, in the finding of unconscionability.  
 The factors revealed in the literature and case review were used 
to create a matrix of factors. This matrix was then used to code a 
randomly selected set of cases. Part IV presents the methodology of 
the coding exercise, which includes how the cases were selected, the 
dependent and independent variables, and the hypotheses posed. 
Part V presents the findings of the coding project. A logistic regres-
sion model is used to analyze the relative importance of the selected 
factors to unconscionability decisions. The relative predictive power 
of the factors distilled from the literature and case law is presented. 
These findings allow us to offer answers to some of the questions 
posed by the scholarly literature and case law. 
 Ultimately, in isolating the operative factors in judicial decisions, 
some insight into the underlying themes or reasons for unconscion-
ability findings will be revealed. It is the hope that the empirical 
analysis of the law, represented by the current study, will provide 
the basis for a better theoretical understanding of the doctrine of un-
conscionability and contract law. At the least, such findings can be 
used to support or debunk the theoretical constructs offered in the 
scholarly literature. Finally, insights gleamed from the coding project 
are used to support a new theory of unconscionability. Part VI offers 
a consent theory of unconscionability that best explains the cases and 
the relative predictive power of the factors measured.  
II.   DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY: LAW IN THE BOOKS 
 The counterpoise to absolute freedom of contract is found in con-
tract law’s limiting or policing doctrines. The New York Court of Ap-
peals, in Rowe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,12 provides a 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV.A. 
 12. 385 N.E.2d 566 (N.Y. 1978). 
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statement highlighting the inherent tension between freedom of con-
tract in the enforcement of contracts and freedom of bargaining in 
the formation of contract: 
It is, of course, far too late in the day to seriously suggest that the 
law has not made substantial inroads into such freedom of private 
contracts. There exists an unavoidable tension between the con-
cept of freedom to contract, which has long been basic to our socio-
economic system, and the equally fundamental belief that an 
enlightened society must to some extent protect its members from 
the potentially harsh effects of an unchecked free market system . . 
. . [T]he law has developed the concept of unconscionability so as to 
prevent the unjust enforcement of onerous contractual terms 
which one party is able to impose under the other because of a sig-
nificant disparity in bargaining power.13 
 Section 2-302’s broad mandate to strike or modify any uncon-
scionable clause or contract makes it potentially the most freedom-
limiting device available to the courts.14 Of course, freedom can mean 
different things depending on one’s perspective. Freedom of contract 
here relates to the strict enforcement of the written contract. Uncon-
scionability, along with more particular limiting doctrines such as 
duress, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation, question the 
freedom of the bargaining.  
 An assessment that unconscionability was the creation of Karl 
Llewellyn and embedded into the U.C.C. would be a misunderstand-
ing. In fact, unconscionability has a long history in the common law15 
and the law of equity.16 The criticism leveled at section 2-302 as be-
                                                                                                                     
 13. Id. at 569. 
 14. Because of its anti-freedom of contract potential, courts have generally been cau-
tious in its application. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law Dur-
ing the 1980’s: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203 (1990). Professor Farnsworth de-
scribed the law of unconscionability as one of “arrested development.” Id. at 222-25. In 
comparing the doctrine of unconscionability with similar principles in England, Germany, 
and France, a commentator noted that despite the grant of judicial discretion, “an under-
current of caution runs through the decisions.” A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger, Unconscion-
able Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Approaches in England, France, Germany and 
the United States, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 455, 498 (1992). 
 15. “Though unconscionability, as an element in the enforcement of contracts, is equi-
table in origin, there is evidence to sustain the conclusion that the common-law courts as 
well were moved by the doctrine to invalidate contracts under certain circumstances.” In-
dustralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 
431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). See generally 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 
128, at 188 (1952). 
 16. Often cited for the principle of unconscionability is the English case of Earl of Ches-
terfield v. Janssen, [1750] 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.). The court set the general parameters for 
nonenforceability as the bargain being “such as no man in his sense and not under a delusion 
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other; which 
are unequitable and unconscientious bargains; and of such even the common law take no-
tice.” Id. at 100. The equity avenue for unconscionability was again acknowledged by the 
California Supreme Court in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981). The en-
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ing overly vague and indeterminate equally applies to equitable un-
conscionability.  Moreover, “[b]ecause barring relief was a matter of 
the chancellor’s discretion, equity never developed a clear set of rules 
for analyzing claims of unconscionability.”17 Another court noted that 
“[t]he common law doctrine of unconscionability has proved difficult 
to define and has been rarely invoked undoubtedly because, other 
than in exceptional cases, it has been largely viewed as grossly inter-
fering with the freedom of contract.”18 The major impact of the codifi-
cation of unconscionability in Article 2 was its transformation from a 
remedy-limiting device to a substantive doctrine.19 By inserting it 
into the Code, Llewellyn sensitized jurists to the necessity to police 
bad faith bargaining and overreaching.  
 Ever since unconscionability’s enactment in Article 2, the courts 
have grappled with finding the appropriate means of implementa-
tion. The following parts will analyze the widely accepted procedural-
substantive bifurcation framework for determining unconscionability 
and the development of a factors analysis used within this frame-
work. A number of court decisions have been selected to identify 
some of the more common approaches and variables (factors) dis-
cussed by judges. Part II.A reviews cases attempting to deal with the 
procedural-substantive bifurcation. The possible approaches posed 
include the need to find a threshold level of both, the need only to 
find substantial evidence of one, and the use of a sliding scale ap-
proach. Part II.B examines cases where the courts have attempted to 
isolate factors to be used in making the unconscionability determina-
tion. These factors were subsequently applied in our coding of cases. 
A.   The Procedural-Substantive Bifurcation 
 The courts soon responded to the skeletal nature of section 2-302 
by focusing on the procedural and substantive elements of uncon-
scionability. The distinction between process and substance has a 
long history in the law.20 The real task for the courts was to provide a 
functional approach or analysis to the abstract bifurcation of uncon-
                                                                                                                     
forcement of contracts of adhesion are limited by “a principle of equity applicable to all con-
tracts generally—is that a contract or provision, even if consistent with the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties, will be denied enforcement if, considered in its context, it is unduly op-
pressive or ‘unconscionable.’ ” Id. at 623; see also Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (fee provision in a bank’s signature card). 
 17. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz. 1995). 
 18. Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 916 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
2002). 
 19. Id.  
 20. An example was the evolution of the English writ system beginning in the twelvth
century. “In contemporary language the common law was therefore a law of procedure; 
whatever substantive law existed was hidden by it . . . . Gradually, the great writs began to 
fill entire fields of human activity, which other lawyers recognized as fields of substantive 
law.” H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 228, 230 (2d ed. 2004). 
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scionability. The seminal case in this regard was delivered in 1965 in 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.21 Its precedential power 
was restated in a 2002 case: 
For the most part, the unconscionability cases follow Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas and look for two factors: (1) unfairness in the for-
mation of the contract, and (2) excessively disproportionate terms . 
. . . Most courts have looked for a sufficient showing of both factors 
in finding a contract unconscionable.22 
 The labels substantive and procedural unconscionability were 
made famous in Leff ’ s seminal article.23 Since the Leff article, the 
use of a procedural-substantive matrix in determining unconscion-
ability has been widely accepted. The great majority of courts have 
felt obligated to support an unconscionability determination through 
a two-step analysis of substantive and procedural unconscionability. 
The most troubling cases are those in which there is overwhelming 
evidence of one form of unconscionability and little evidence of the 
other form. Is a harshly one-sided clause insulated from attack when 
there is no evidence of procedural naughtiness? Is a contract in 
which there is no truly unconscionable component, but is one-sided 
as a whole, insulated from attack even though there is overwhelming 
evidence of procedural unconscionability? Or can the doctrine of un-
conscionability be applied where, despite the lack of an individual 
unconscionable term, the contract is substantially unbalanced and 
there is no evidence of bargaining naughtiness?24 One answer is that 
the party challenging a clause or contract as unconscionable must 
meet a threshold burden on both forms of unconscionability. An al-
                                                                                                                     
 21. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). A Lexis search found ninety-one district court, 
twenty-one court of appeals, and two Supreme Court cases citing Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co. (last searched Oct. 25, 2004). Justice Stevens stated that “Judge J. 
Skelly Wright set out the state of the law succinctly in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Co.” Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). As recently as 2003, the 6th Circuit cited Williams as authority: “The crucial 
question is whether ‘each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of 
it, [had] a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the im-
portant terms hidden in a maze of fine print . . . ?’ ” Ohio Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Smith, 724 
N.E.2d 1155, 1161 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Williams, 350 F.2d at 449). See also Mor-
rison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 313 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 2003). See generally Prince, 
supra note 3, at 477 (“[T]he Williams formulation has gone on to become probably the most 
often-cited definition of unconscionability . . . .”). 
 22. Sitogum Holdings, Inc., 800 A.2d at 921. 
 23. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New Clause, 
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485  (1967).  
 24. Robert Braucher posed this question in the following manner: “Theoretically it is 
possible for a contract to be oppressive taken as a whole, even though there is no weakness in 
the bargaining process and no single term which is in itself unconscionable.” Braucher, supra 
note 6, at 340. A common sense response would be that in a free market, survival of the fit-
test economy, such imbalanced contracts are not uncommon. Braucher’s response was that 
such contracts devoid of procedural weakness were not common. “Ordinarily, however, an un-
conscionable contract involves other factors as well as an overall imbalance.” Id. 
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ternative approach would sustain a claim where there is overwhelm-
ing evidence of one form of unconscionability.  
 Some courts have questioned the aforementioned approach of re-
quiring findings of both forms of unconscionability. The Arizona Su-
preme Court noted that “perhaps a majority [of courts] have held 
that there must be some quantum of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability to establish a claim, and take a balancing approach 
in applying them.”25 By using a balancing approach, it implies that a 
minimum of one type of unconscionability will suffice when there is 
overwhelming evidence of the other type. The issue then becomes 
what is the quantum or minimum threshold?  
 The Arizona Supreme Court also noted that “[o]ther courts have 
held that it is sufficient if either is shown.”26 The court ultimately 
concluded that “a claim of unconscionability can be established with 
a showing of substantive unconscionability alone, especially in cases 
involving either price-cost disparity or limitation of remedies.”27 The 
coding project will determine the frequency of cases in which a find-
ing of unconscionability was based solely on the existence of one type 
of unconscionability.28 
 A middle ground, as discussed above, would adopt a sliding scale 
in which greater levels of one form lowers the threshold of evidence 
needed for the other form of unconscionability. The coding project 
measures the degree in which both forms of unconscionability are 
discussed and are required by the courts.29 As noted above, the cases 
illustrate the overwhelming judicial belief that evidence of both pro-
cedural and substantive unconscionability is required to sustain a 
claim.30 However, a number of cases have expressly recognized that 
the threshold needed to prove both forms of unconscionability is not 
fixed but may vary based upon a balancing or sliding scale. The two 
forms are negatively related in that the greater the degree of sub-
stantive unconscionability the lesser the degree of procedural uncon-
scionability is needed. This was the approach adopted in Funding 
Systems Leasing Corp. v. King Louie International, Inc.31 The case 
                                                                                                                     
 25. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995). 
 26. Id. (citing Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y. 1988)). The 
Gillman court made it clear that cases based solely upon substantive unconscionability 
were “exceptional.” Gillman, 534 N.E.2d at 831. 
 27. Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 59. 
 28. See infra Part IV.D.1-2.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. 597 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); see also Ilkhchooyi v. Best, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 
775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he greater the degree of substantive unconscionability, the less 
the degree of procedural unconscionability that is required . . . .”). It is interesting to note that 
California’s unconscionability doctrine is codified as a part of its general contract law and not 
just its law of sales. “The established doctrine that a court may refuse to enforce an uncon-
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involved the enforceability of a disclaimer clause in a lease-purchase 
installment contract. The court described the case as an easy one in 
that it found the particular clause to be fair and found no evidence of 
procedural unconscionability. The court noted that the parties were 
all merchants and that the disclaimer clause was conspicuously pre-
sented. The disclaimer clause appeared “on the front page in capital 
letters and in red color.”32  
 The court acknowledged the acceptance of the “Leff test”33 that 
distinguishes between procedural and substantive unconscionability. 
But, despite this being an easy case, the court felt compelled to make 
a “[s]liding [s]cale [e]valuation.”34 It concluded that “[a]pplying a slid-
ing scale balancing of all factors, there has been an insufficient proof 
of such unfairness as would justify declaring invalid an express pro-
vision of the written contract . . . .” Two of the factors that weighed in 
the court’s reasoning were that “equipment leasing carries great ad-
vantages for the buyer-lessee” and “[t]he disclaimer of warranty by 
the financing party is universal in the commercial world.”35 These 
factors could easily weigh in the opposite direction. First, the great 
advantages factor transforms such a leasing-financing contract into 
one of necessity. Second, the fact that the clause is universal can 
support a claim that the buyer had no alternative but to accept the 
clause. Instead, the court reasoned that it was evidence of the 
clause’s reasonableness. 
B.   Developing a Factors Analysis 
 As in most cases of judicial application of legal standards, the 
courts will often enumerate a number of factors that they use in ap-
plying the standard to the novelty of real world disputes. This has 
been the case in the application of the doctrine of unconscionability. 
A review of the case law was undertaken to uncover, and to better 
understand, the factors used by the courts. These factors were then 
used to code cases to determine their predictive power or level of 
commonality among a pool of cases. Alternatively stated, the review 
of the cases revealed a matrix of factors weighed by courts in making 
decisions. Many of these factors were then tested in the case coding 
project. The purpose of coding cases based upon a factors analysis 
was to see if there were specific factors or groups of factors that were 
more predictive of a judicial outcome than others. If such factors are 
present, then the development of a theory or analytical framework 
                                                                                                                     
scionable provision in any contract was codified in 1979 in section 1670.5 . . . .” Id. at 774 
(emphasis added).  
 32. Funding Systems Leasing Corp., 597 S.W.2d at 627. 
 33. Id. at 634. 
 34. Id. at 635. 
 35. Id. at 635-36. 
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for unconscionability may be constructed based upon such findings. 
The factors emanating from the case review are grouped and ana-
lyzed below between procedural and substantive factors. 
1.   Procedural Factors 
 The role of a factors analysis is represented well in Willie v. 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.36 The case involved the enforceabil-
ity of an exculpatory clause in a contract between a telephone com-
pany that had inadvertently deleted the advertisement of a business 
customer from its phonebook. The court formulated a ten-factor test 
to be used in applying the unconscionability doctrine. These factors 
went to both procedure and substance. In the area of procedure, it 
listed whether the contract was a standard form, whether the clause 
at issue was boilerplate, whether the clause was hidden (noncon-
spicuous), whether the language used was incomprehensible to a 
layperson, whether there was an inequality of bargaining power, and 
whether there was an exploitation of the “underprivileged, unsophis-
ticated, uneducated and the illiterate.”37 
 Courts are more at ease in recognizing factors indicative of proce-
dural unconscionability than substantive unconscionability. The 
court in Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp.38 provides a typical listing of pro-
cedural factors: 
Under the “procedural” rubric come those factors bearing upon . . . 
the “real and voluntary meeting of the minds” of the contracting 
parties: age, education, intelligence, business acumen and experi-
ence, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract, whether 
the terms were explained to the weaker party, whether alterations 
in the printed terms were possible, whether there were alternative 
sources of supply . . . .39 
 The enumeration of such factors has helped courts flush out the 
key operative facts on a case-by-case basis. The court in Nasco, Inc. v. 
Public Storage, Inc.40 provides another example when it stated the 
following: 
                                                                                                                     
 36. 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976). 
 37. Id. at 907. One commentator notes that judges often focus on the facts that one of 
the parties to a contract is poor or uneducated. “However, these judges do not explain how 
any of these characteristics are connected with the ability to make rational economic deci-
sions.” Philip Bridwell, Comment, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Uncon-
scionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1525 (2003); cf. Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of 
Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977) (arguing that there is no evi-
dence that poverty is related to incompetence). 
 38. 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
 39. Id. at 268. 
 40. No. 92-12731-RCL, 1995 WL 337072 (D. Mass. 1995). 
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[A] court may take into account a myriad of factors, such as the 
commercial sophistication of the party claiming unconscionability; 
whether such party was represented by counsel; whether the 
clause was obscure or buried in fine print, or conversely, whether 
it was out on the table and the subject of active negotiation.41  
The case coding project measures the predictive power of conspic-
uousness, negotiation, and legal representation.42 
 One meta-factor that underlies most of the unconscionability 
cases is the merchant-consumer distinction.43 The fact that an uncon-
scionable clause was inserted in a merchant form contract in a mer-
chant-consumer transaction has been a common factor in successful 
unconscionability cases.44 There are few cases that have found un-
conscionability to the benefit of a merchant. In one case involving a 
“merchant” farmer and a grain elevator company, the court acknowl-
edges that “[a]lthough courts have been receptive to pleas of uncon-
scionability raised by consumers, they have been reluctant to do so in 
commercial transactions.”45  
 The courts have generally failed to adequately define merchant in 
relationship to the unconscionability doctrine. However, some courts 
have recognized that not all merchants are equal in sophistication or 
bargaining power.46 They recognize that in merchant-to-merchant 
transactions, the lack of sophistication of one of the merchant parties 
renders that party susceptible to the type of overreaching found in 
consumer unconscionability cases. For example, the court in Sosik v. 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id. at *5. 
 42. See infra Parts IV-V. 
 43. See Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964). This was 
one of the first cases applying section 2-302, and it symbolizes the use of unconscionability 
as a device to protect consumers. 
 44. See infra Part IV.D.1-2. 
 45. Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47, 50 (N.D. 1975). 
 46. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. Rptr. 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding 
that a contract between enormous diversified corporation and relatively small but experi-
enced farming company found to be unconscionable); Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 
(Ind. 1971) (holding as unconscionable clauses in a service station lease that exculpated the 
oil company from any liability for its negligence, and obliged the lessee to indemnify the oil 
company for any loss); Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (hold-
ing that although the notion of unconscionability is most frequently employed to shield dis-
advantaged and uneducated consumers from overreaching merchants and although findings 
of unconscionability are rare in commercial settings, commercial contracts are not immune 
from a finding of unconscionability under proper circumstances); Allen v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 
171 N.W.2d 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (holding as unconscionable a clause exculpating Bell 
from any liability to yellow page advertisers for failure to include advertising); Shell Oil Co. v. 
Marinello, 307 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1973) (provision in dealer agreement giving Shell absolute 
right to terminate on ten days’ notice void as against public policy); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. 
Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976) (holding that a ten-day cancellation clause in dealer 
agreement, available only to company, unconscionable on its face).  
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Albin Marine, Inc.47 focused on the level of sophistication of one of the 
merchant parties. The court noted that the party was a merchant or 
businessperson in the conduct of his business, but not a merchant for 
the transaction in question. In that case, a charter service company 
purchased a boat from a boat seller. The proprietor of the charter 
service company had previously operated a failed construction com-
pany and then a credit card processing company. The court noted 
that the boat seller was “a large, experienced boat retailer [and] on 
the other hand, [the purchaser was] a relatively inexperienced indi-
vidual, particularly in the area of purchasing boats to be used com-
mercially.”48 The court found a disclaimer clause in the sale contract 
to be unconscionable citing the facts that the parties were “not of 
equal commercial sophistication” and the purchaser was “particu-
larly unsophisticated.”49 
 Courts have sometimes isolated particular factors as most rele-
vant. The Washington Supreme Court singled out conspicuousness 
and negotiations as especially strong evidence against a finding of 
unconscionability, noting that “[i]t is readily apparent that both ‘con-
spicuousness’ and ‘negotiations’ are factors, albeit not conclusive, 
which are certainly relevant when determining the issue of conscion-
ability . . . .” 50  The court recognized the importance of prior dealings 
and trade practice as additional factors.51 
 Finally, the courts have not felt restrained by the sales-nonsales 
contract distinction.52 They have liberally applied section 2-302 
methodology to nonsale contract disputes, especially in real prop-
erty53 and financial transactions.54 Twenty-five years ago, the Su-
                                                                                                                     
 47. No. 020539B, 2003 WL 21500516 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003); see also Industralease 
Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1977) (merchant-to-merchant transaction). In Industralease, the court held a dis-
claimer clause to be unconscionable. Regarding the fact that a merchant party was claim-
ing unconscionability, the court stated that the “term ‘unconscionable’ is thus flexible, to be 
applied within the framework of the transaction under scrutiny, and considered in light of 
the commercial climate then existing and the common law.” Id. at 431. 
 48. Sosik, 2003 WL 21500516,  at *7. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 544 P.2d 20, 23 (Wash. 1975). 
 51. Id.  
 52. See infra Part IV.D.1-4. 
 53. Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915 (N.J. 2002) (holding option contract 
for the transfer of property was unconscionable); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 
(N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975) (holding attorneys’ fees that were disproportionate at law in a real 
property lease were unconscionable); Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., Inc., 338 
N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (holding apartment lease unconscionable and unenforce-
able); see also Jeffrey L. Licht, The Clog on the Equity of Redemption and Its Effect on Mod-
ern Real Estate Finance, 60 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 452 (1986) (documenting the increased use 
of the principle of unconscionability in mortgage law). 
 54. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding 
credit card company’s cardholder agreements were procedurally and substantively uncon-
scionable); Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding secured 
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preme Court of Washington acknowledged that “[o]f growing impor-
tance is the tendency of courts to find the Section on unconscionabil-
ity, Section 2-302, appropriate to nonsales deals.”55 This is a clear ex-
ample of the importance the Code has played in influencing the 
common law of contracts. 
2.   Substantive Factors 
 The “ten-factor test” provided by the court in Willie v. Southwest-
ern Bell Telephone Co.,56 and discussed in the previous section, in-
cluded a number of substantive factors. They include the existence of 
an excessive price or “significant cost-price disparity,” a clause that 
amounts to a “denial of basic rights and remedies,” penalty clauses, 
and an overall imbalance in the bargain.57 The court’s listing of pen-
alty and limitation of remedy clauses alerts us to the fact that certain 
types of clauses have historically received heightened judicial scru-
tiny. These include the following: liquidated damages (penalty), ex-
culpatory damages, disclaimer, covenants not to compete, limitation 
of liability, limitation of remedy clauses, and arbitration clauses.58 
One court acknowledged that cases involving price disparity and 
                                                                                                                     
loan at rate of 200% per annum on principal that rose to $99,000 was both substantively 
and procedurally unconscionable); Ed. Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1971) (contract covering enrollment in school and financing); David v. Mfrs. Hano-
ver Trust Co., 287 N.Y.S.2d 503 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968) (holding jury waiver clauses on signa-
ture cards were unconscionable and inoperative in depositor’s action against bank); see Al-
vin C. Harrell, Basic Choices in the Law of Auto Finance: Contract Versus Regulation, 7 
CHAP. L. REV. 107 (2004). 
 55. Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308, 1312 (Wash. 1979); Baker v. Seattle, 
484 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1971) (equipment leasing); see also Favors v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co., 309 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (bailment); Martha Shaffer, Domestic Contracts, 
Part II: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 20 CAN. J. FAM. L. 261 
(2004) (Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 2004 S.C.R. 22, 
adopts a hard line on marital contracting, leaving little scope for courts to examine the 
substantive fairness of the contracts); Joline F. Sikaitis, Comment, A New Form of Family 
Planning? The Enforceability of No-Child Provisions in Prenuptial Agreements, 54 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 335, 357 (2004) (questioning the enforceability of no-child provisions in prenup-
tial agreements, saying “[i]n assessing the enforceability of the agreement, a court will 
consider the procedural and substantive unconscionability . . . .”). 
 56. 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976). Other courts have applied the Willie v. Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Co. ten-factor matrix. See, e.g., Broadway v. Household Fin. Corp. of Hunts-
ville, 351 So. 2d 1373 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977). 
 57. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d at 907. One of the factors is not really a factor but a rec-
ognition of the importance of context in the making of the unconscionability determination. 
The court states that a factor to be considered is “the circumstances surrounding the execu-
tion of the contract, including its commercial setting, its purpose and actual effect.” Id. 
 58. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Un-
conscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004) (asserting that there has been a resurgence in 
the use of the doctrine of unconscionability over the years as the use of arbitration has in-
creased; courts continue to invalidate unconscionability clauses despite the Federal Arbi-
tration Act); Diane P. Wood, The Brave New World of Arbitration, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 383 
(2003) (explaining that many of the cases focusing on the one-sidedness of arbitration 
agreements also use the rhetoric of unconscionability). 
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limitation of remedy provisions could apply unconscionability even 
without any evidence of procedural overreaching.59 Section 2-719 of 
the Code provides another example of heightened judicial scrutiny by 
mandating that limitation of remedy clauses that exclude the recov-
ery of consequential damages by consumers are per se unconscion-
able.60 The fact that certain clauses have long been scrutinized by the 
courts may indicate that unconscionability is just another device 
used by courts to restrict the reach of these clauses. The coding pro-
ject will measure the prevalence of these types of clauses in uncon-
scionability jurisprudence.61 
III.   UNCONSCIONABILITY SCHOLARSHIP: EMPEROR’S NEW CLAUSE 62 
AND BEYOND 
 In the late 1960s, the first generation of unconscionability litera-
ture63 following the enactment of the U.C.C. focused on the vagaries 
of the language of section 2-302 and the need to develop an analytical 
framework to guide judicial decisionmaking. As one of the Code’s 
most controversial provisions, it immediately generated tremendous 
scholarly attention.64 The next two Parts will analyze a select few of 
these seminal articles. The articles selected add insights and make 
claims that will be explored in the coding project. 
A.   Defining the Undefinable 
 The most influential of these articles65 was Arthur Leff’s 1967 arti-
cle: Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New Clause.66 Pro-
fessor Leff criticized section 2-302 as an example of code-drafting that 
results in an end product that “say[s] nothing with words.”67 He then 
detailed the history of unconscionability premised on the finding of 
both procedural and substantive elements. This bifurcation was 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995). 
 60. U.C.C § 2-719(2) (2005). See generally Jonathon A. Eddy, On the ‘Essential’ Pur-
poses of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of U.C.C. Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REV. 28, 
42-50 (1977). 
 61. See infra Part IV.D.1-4. 
 62. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 23. 
 63. See generally id.; Braucher, supra note 6; M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Uncon-
scionability, 78 YALE L.J. 759 (1969); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Re-
appraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975); Murray, supra note 4; John A. Spanogle, Jr., Ana-
lyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969); Richard E. Speidel, Un-
conscionability, Assent, and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1970).  
 64. Bridwell, supra note 37, at 1513 (“Section 2-302 . . . is one of the Code’s most con-
troversial provisions. By 1967, only 16 years after the first official version of the Code ap-
peared, over 130 articles had been published on the doctrine of unconscionablity.”). 
 65. Professor Hillman refers to Leff ’ s article as a “leading article [in which he] . . . 
suggested a framework [of procedural-substantive unconscionability] that courts and com-
mentators have followed.” Hillman, supra note 6, at 2. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Leff, supra note 23, at 559. 
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adopted as the dominate analytical framework in determining uncon-
scionability.68 The coding project attempts to measure the relative im-
portance of the procedural and substantive unconscionability elements 
in judicial reasoning.69 Professor Leff also remarked that despite sec-
tion 2-302’s shortcomings, “courts will most likely adjust, encrusting 
the irritating aspects of the section with a smoothing nacre of more or 
less reasonable applications.”70 Our survey attempts to discover if such 
reasonable applications have produced a consistent jurisprudence. 
 Leff ’ s framework has not been without critics. Professor Hillman 
rejects the bifurcation of unconscionability as “raising more issues 
than it resolves.”71 Instead, he argues that unconscionability cases 
can be divided into two groups: “common-law-doctrines unconscion-
ability” and “pure unconscionability.”72 The former type primarily 
concerns matters of assent. It is not the fairness of a term, but the 
quality of the assent which is relevant. Professor Hillman poses this 
question: “What is the relationship of existing legal doctrines such as 
duress, undue influence, fraud, the duty to disclose, contract inter-
pretation, and contract formation to procedural unconscionability?”73 
He concludes that these types of cases are best handled directly by 
the doctrines directly targeted to the issue of bargaining assent. This 
is because these types of unconscionability cases are primarily made 
up of assent cases and there is no need to consume the courts’ time in 
analyzing substantive unconscionability. The coding project meas-
ures the existence and importance of existing doctrines, including 
fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, duress, and bad faith in cases 
that also discuss unconscionability.74 Ultimately, we conclude that a 
consent theory of unconscionability best explains unconscionability 
cases, including those Hillman characterizes as common law doc-
trines unconscionability and pure unconscionability.75 
 The relationship between unconscionability and common law doc-
trines pertaining to reality of consent (mistake, misrepresentation, 
duress, undue influence) and other U.C.C. policing principles (good 
faith, fair dealing, impracticability) raises the issue of the relation-
                                                                                                                     
 68. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 57-58 (Ariz. 1995) (“The 
framework upon which the vast majority of courts construct their analysis consists of the 
well recognized division of unconscionability into substantive and procedural parts . . . . 
[T]his dichotomy evolved from a distinction made by the late Professor Leff in his oft-cited 
article Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause.”).  
 69. See infra Part IV.D.1-4. 
 70. Leff, supra note 23, at 558. 
 71. Hillman,  supra note 6, at 3-4. 
 72. Id. at 4-5. Pure unconscionability is the type that often involves findings of both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability. In contrast, common law doctrine’s uncon-
scionability pertains to procedural issues, namely, the quality of the assent. 
 73. Id. at 4. 
 74. See infra Part IV.D.1-4. 
 75. See infra Part VI. 
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ship of unconscionability to highly-scrutinized clauses, such as limi-
tation of liability, limitation of remedies, warranty disclaimer, attor-
ney fee, arbitration, and exculpatory clauses.76 If a large portion of 
unconscionability cases involves scrutiny of these types of clauses, 
then the characterization of the unconscionability doctrine as broadly 
applied would be debunked. In such cases, the unconscionability 
analysis is either ancillary to the application of a more specific polic-
ing doctrine or is a purely redundant and unnecessary support for 
voiding an offending clause or contract. The coding project measures 
the frequency in which unconscionablility cases involve one of these 
highly-scrutinized clauses.77 
 Two other issues raised by Hillman in his article relate to the cur-
rent project. The first involves the role of conspicuousness in insulat-
ing a contract from a claim of unconscionability. Does full disclosure 
or “superconscionable procedural conduct”78 eliminate the opportu-
nity to find procedural unconscionability? Hillman concludes that 
disclosure does not equate to understanding and, therefore, conspic-
uousness cannot completely insulate a contract or term from a claim 
of unconscionability.79 The coding project survey measures the role of 
conspicuousness in the unconscionability decision.80 
 A second issue raised by Hillman and others81 is whether uncon-
scionability is available in merchant-to-merchant transactions. He 
concludes that it is rarely needed in commercial transactions because 
merchants are generally not “dependent” on one another (in the over-
reaching sense) and they are capable of protecting themselves from 
the insertion of shocking terms into their contracts.82 However, Hill-
man asserts that unconscionability should be made available in the 
rare situation where the merchant possesses the characteristics of a 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Professor Mallor states that “[c]ourts have found substantive unconscionability 
most frequently in various types of risk shifting or ‘remedy meddling’ provisions . . . .” Jane 
P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 SW. L.J. 1065, 1073 
(1986); see also Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 793-808 (discussing warranty disclaimers, 
remedy limitations, submission to foreign jurisdiction, repossession under installment con-
tract, and waiver of defense). 
 77. See infra Part IV.D.1-2. 
 78. Hillman, supra note 6. 
 79. Other scholars have advanced a greater role for superconscionability through dis-
closure and conspicuousness. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of 
Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 
359 (1976) (recommending legal rules governing disclosure, conspicuousness, and intelligi-
bility of form terms in response to the problem of suboptimal information); see also Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 
(1995). Professor Eisenberg suggests that form terms be enforced only when “separately 
signed” by buyers. Id. at 311. 
 80. See infra Part IV.D.1-4, IV.E.2. 
 81. See, e.g., Mallor, supra note 76. 
 82. Hillman, supra note 6. 
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consumer.83 We disagree with the implication that all merchants are 
alike but for a relatively small set of merchants qua consumers. A 
merchant, broadly speaking, can encompass any incorporated busi-
ness.84 Given the popularity of the corporate entity, along with the 
complexity of the market system, the unsophisticated or dependent 
merchant is more likely to be the rule than the exception. Professor 
Mallor in a 1986 article stated that “the case law reveals an increas-
ing tendency to recognize that commercial parties can be victimized 
by the same types of bargaining unfairness that stimulated the re-
birth and expansion of unconscionability.”85 Our project measures 
whether this recognition is reflected in a trend toward the greater 
application of unconscionability to merchant-to-merchant or mer-
chant qua consumer cases.86 
 If the typical unconscionability case involves a consumer, then the 
characteristics of the consumer in winning unconscionability claims 
is relevant to understanding the unconscionability doctrine as ap-
plied. The literature highlights three relevant consumer characteris-
tics as level of sophistication, level of education, and socio-economic 
status (level of wealth).87 The coding project measures the prevalence 
                                                                                                                     
 83. Id. at 43-44. Professor Murray referred to this class of merchants as “merchants 
in name only.” John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 778 (1982). 
 84. The U.C.C. also defines “merchant” broadly as  
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by occupation holds him-
self out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved 
in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his 
employment of an agent or broker or intermediary who by his occupation holds 
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.  
U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2005). 
 85. Mallor,  supra note 76, at 1088. 
 86. See infra Part IV.D.1-4. 
 87. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 63 (explaining inequality of bargaining position 
and exploitation of underprivileged). Courts have typically used the doctrine of uncon-
scionability to protect consumers. This consumer-protection theme is based on the belief 
that consumers are less educated and less sophisticated relative to merchant sellers. As 
such, they are more prone to accept unconscionable terms. Law-and-economics scholars 
have argued that there is no support for this nexus. See, e.g., Harrell, supra note 54, at 
114. “The gap between merchant and consumer, in terms of information and bargaining 
power, has apparently narrowed rather than widened. The best consumer protection of all 
has always been the consumer’s self-interest, and unsophisticated consumers often get the 
better of larger and more experienced negotiating partners.” Id. at 114 (citing Eric A. Pos-
ner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury 
Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 296 
(1995)). “By now it should be apparent to almost everyone that stature, resources, educa-
tion, and a high income do not equate to wisdom or shrewdness.” Id. at 114 n.26. “Influ-
enced by advertising schemes that rely on popular emotions, consumers are often lured 
into merchants’ establishments and reportedly induced into unwittingly signing adhesion 
contracts with onerous terms that cannot be viewed as representing consensual transac-
tions.” Id. at 113; see also Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Econom-
ics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 716-21 
(1992) (arguing that the economic model is flawed because consumers are unlikely to read 
form terms or understand the terms they do read); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. 
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of these characteristics in unconscionability cases.88 It will also 
measure whether these characteristics have become more or less im-
portant over time.89 
 Another phenomenon to be measured is the impact of the U.C.C. 
Article 2, more specifically section 2-302, outside of sale of goods 
transactions.90 The impact of the U.C.C. has been twofold. First, it 
has had an impact on the law of sales as expressed in its goals to 
harmonize and modernize the law of sales throughout the fifty juris-
dictions of the United States.91 The second impact is its unintended 
impact on the general law of contracts. The coding project measures 
the proportion of nonsale of goods cases that make reference to sec-
tion 2-302 and its surrounding jurisprudence.92 It also measures the 
trend over time in unconscionability cases between the proportion of 
sales and nonsales cases.93 
 The application of unconscionability outside of sales law should 
not come as a surprise. As shown earlier, the use of unconscionability 
was previously developed in equity. In sum, the unconscionability 
principle was and is available in the equity wing of general contract 
law.94 The interesting phenomenon is the “direct” application of sec-
tion 2-302 by analogy to nonsales cases. For example, a New York 
court in Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen v. Schumacher95 states:  
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code gives a court faced 
with an unconscionable contract the power to refuse enforcement 
of the contract or to strike or limit the unconscionable clause itself. 
The unconscionability principle, however, has no peculiar applica-
tion to contracts for the sale of goods. “Courts can, if they choose, 
                                                                                                                     
Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 483 
(2002). A merchant-consumer approach based upon an economic analysis would simply as-
sess whether a term is inefficient as a precursor to the application of an unconscionability 
analysis. See Daniel T. Ostas, Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An Economic Model 
and an Empirical Test, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 535, 559-66 (1991) (claiming that contract terms 
that allocate costs inefficiently are likely to be found unconscionable). 
 88. See infra Parts IV.D.1-2, IV.E 2. 
 89. See infra Part IV.D.2-4. 
 90. The potential use of section 2-302 outside the scope of sales law was offered by 
Professor Ellinghaus in his 1969 article. He noted that financing agreements, although be-
yond the scope of Article 2, the courts will feel pressured to apply section 2-302 to such 
agreements. Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 767-68, 808-12 (“Going Beyond Sales”). 
 91. U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1), (3) (2005) (stating that the underlying purpose of the U.C.C. 
is “to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions” and “to 
make uniform the law among various jurisdictions.”). 
 92. See infra Part IV.D.1-2. 
 93. See infra Part IV.D.2-4. 
 94. See generally LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACT: STANDARDS AND 
PRINCIPLES (2001) (tracing the principles of fairness of exchange in the common law, in-
cluding the principle of unconscionability, to medieval just price theory and to Aristotelian-
Thomastic philosophy). 
 95. 419 N.Y.S.2d 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). 
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carry the principle over into real estate or any other kind of cases, 
quite apart from the Code.”96 
The idea that courts are free to carry-over the framework of section 2-
302 into the general law of contracts indicates that the courts generally 
fail to fully recognize the common law precept of unconscionability. 
 The current review of cases indicates that courts directly apply 
the factors and approach developed under section 2-302 without ref-
erence to any overarching equitable principle of unconscionability.97 
The importance of this is that, by and large, section 2-302 uncon-
scionability has consumed any separate notion of equitable uncon-
scionability in general contract law.  
 One of the major criticisms leveled at the doctrine of unconscion-
ability, as expressed in section 2-302, is that it fails to prescribe mean-
ingful content, namely a workable definition of unconscionability. Sec-
tion 2-302 merely allows courts the option of not enforcing a clause or 
a contract or to limit their application when they find as “a matter of 
law” that a contract or clause is unconscionable.98 The comments to 
section 2-302 provide little additional insight. Comment 1 states: 
This section makes it possible for a court to police explicitly 
against the contracts or terms which the court finds to be uncon-
scionable instead of attempting to achieve the result by an adverse 
construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and 
acceptance, or by a determination that the term is contrary to pub-
lic policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. The section 
allows a court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the con-
tract or a particular term of the contract and to make a conclusion 
of law as to its unconscionability. Courts have been particularly 
vigilant when the contract at issue is set forth in a standard form. 
The principle is one of prevention of oppression and unfair surprise 
and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior 
bargaining power. The basic test is whether, in the light of the 
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the 
particular trade or case, the term or contract involved is so one-
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at 
the time of the making of the contract.99 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. at 562 (quoting D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §10.7, at 713 (1993)). 
 97. See, e.g., Art’s Flower Shop, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of W. Va., Inc., 
413 S.E.2d 670 (W. Va. 1991) (holding when flower shop brought action for breach of con-
tract against telephone company that failed to include its advertisement in yellow pages 
directory, the contract was unconscionable); Associated Press v. S. Ark. Radio Co., 809 
S.W.2d 695 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (holding when national news service sued local radio sta-
tion for breach of contract to pay for news services that contract under which news service 
was entitled to its profits during the balance of its term was unconscionable).  
 98. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1. 
 99. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2005). It should be noted that revised Article 2 makes only 
one minor change to section 2-302 and its comments. It changes the word “clause” to “term” 
in the body of the section. It makes no changes to the comments. 
1086  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1067 
 
Although it fails to provide a definition or clear framework for apply-
ing unconscionability, comment 1 has been mined for insight by 
scholars100 and courts.101 
 Professor Ellinghaus in his 1969 Yale Law Journal article In De-
fense of Unconscionability102 offers a defense to the definitional criti-
cism by asserting that the doctrine of unconscionability is not a rule, 
but a standard,103 or what he refers to as one of the “residual catego-
ries.”104 Such residual constructs inherently create definitional prob-
lems associated with their application or use: “[N]ot all of the actu-
ally observable facts . . . fit into the sharply, positively defined cate-
gories, they tend to be given one or more blanket names which refer 
to categories negatively defined . . . .”105 This application of negatively 
defined residual concepts to law can be seen at work in the Sum-
mers-Burton106 discussion of the standard of good faith. Summers’ 
position is that good faith can best be defined negatively by the rec-
                                                                                                                     
 100. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 6, at 339 (quoting comment one); William B. Dav-
enport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121 
(1967) (discussing the notions of oppression and unfair surprise noted in comment one); 
Murray, supra note 4, at 13-23 (discussing assumption or allocation of risks); see also Spei-
del, supra note 63, at 359 & n.2 (quoting the purpose of comment one to prevent oppres-
sion, but not disturbing the allocation of risks).  
 101. See, e.g., Willie Co. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976) (breach of con-
tract quoting comment one); Lytle v. Roto Lincoln Mercury & Subaru, Inc., 521 N.E.2d 201 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (revocation of sales contract); Beneficial Commercial Corp. v. Cottrell, 
688 P.2d 1254 (Mont. 1984) (warranty disclaimer clause); W.L. May Co., Inc., v. Philco-
Ford Corp., 543 P.2d 283 (Or. 1975) (termination of a distributorship contract between the 
parties, quoting comment one). 
 102. Ellinghaus, supra note 63. 
 103. Id. at 759 (citing Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 
641, 645-46 (1923)). Subsequent to the publication of Ellinghaus’s article, a substantial lit-
erature has developed differentiating between rules and standards, popularly referred to 
as the rules-standards debate. See generally Duncan Kenedy, Form and Substance in Pri-
vate Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (discussing distinction between rules 
and standards; benefits and costs of formal rules or “formal realizability”); Margaret Jane 
Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 823 (1991) 
(discussing that rules and standards are not distinct poles but vary in degrees of “rule-
ness”); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (discussing role of 
discretion in rule and standard applications); Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (analyzing the role of rules and stan-
dards in Supreme Court decisions). 
 104. Ellinghaus cites Parsons for the proposition of residual categories. Id. at 759 (cit-
ing T. PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 17 (1937)).  
 105. Id.  
 106. Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968); Robert S. Summers, The 
General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 
810 (1982); Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract—A Reply to 
Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1982); cf. E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Per-
formance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 666 (1966); Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 
IOWA L. REV. 299 (1988) (discussing the distinction between good faith in performance and 
good faith in enforcement). 
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ognition of categories of bad faith or what he has referred to as “ex-
cluders.”107 Thus, rules are often viewed as relatively closed devices 
that provide discrete on-off application. Standards, in contrast, pro-
vide a continuum that gives the courts the needed flexibility to apply 
the law to a diverse set of cases. 
 Defense of Unconscionability poses some interesting questions for 
which the present research will provide some tentative answers. The 
first series of questions revolves around the bifurcation of procedural-
substantive unconscionability forwarded by Leff. Professor Ellinghaus 
poses this question: “[M]ay the parties, by a sufficient compliance with 
the proprieties of bargaining, insulate the contract from judicial inter-
vention on the ground of ‘substantive’ unconscionability?”108 Does pu-
rity of procedure overcome a substantively unconscionable result? Al-
ternatively, “what level of bargaining unfairness (if any) . . . is suffi-
cient to entitle a court to refuse to enforce a contract for unconscion-
ability even where the terms of the contract are not themselves uncon-
scionable?”109 Thus, unconscionability scholarship has raised the same 
issues as we saw evidenced in the court cases.110 Therefore, the meas-
urement of the relative importance of procedural-substantive factors is 
a major objective of the coding project.111 
 Ellinghaus concludes that unconscionability qua residual category 
is by nature not susceptible to definition. It is, in Llewellyn’s vi-
sion,112 susceptible to definition and application only through a case-
by-case contextual analysis. It is the novelty of real-world cases that 
gives unconscionability its meaning. This meaning is not a fixed 
meaning that Ellinghaus rejects as impossible to attain, but a dy-
namic meaning that is forever evolving and forever informed by real-
world context. In the end, Ellinghaus concludes that the best that 
can be done is for the courts “to develop a set of relevant ques-
tions.”113 The main purpose of the current project is to determine 
what sets of questions or factors have been weighed by our courts 
over the past thirty-five years.  
 The single most dominant or predictive factor alluded to by El-
linghaus is whether the claim of unconscionability is directed at a 
form contract.114 The “problem” of standard form contracting and the 
use of unconscionability as the primary policing doctrine has been 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Summers, supra note 106. 
 108. Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 762. 
 109. Id. at 763 
 110. See supra note 101. 
 111. See infra Part IV.D.1-2. 
 112. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual-Track Theory of In-
terpretation, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397 (2004). 
 113. Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 814. 
 114. “Most cases so far decided under Section 2-302 have involved ‘form’ contracts, but 
the fact is as often ignored as commented upon.” Id. at 764-65.  
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extensively explored in the literature.115 The project codes cases be-
tween form and custom drafted contracts.116 This coding, however, 
only recognizes the fact of the existence of a form contract and not 
whether it was a factor that was heavily weighed by the courts. 
B.   An Alternate Analytical Framework: The Circle of Assent 
 The vagaries of section 2-302 provided the opportunity for scholars 
to offer analytical frameworks to guide judicial reasoning. One such 
example is presented in Professor Murray’s 1969 article Unconscion-
ability: Unconscionability117 in which he uses the English concept of 
fundamental breach to analyze unconscionability. He uses it to fashion 
a three-part approach to unconscionability: apparent assent, material-
ity, and genuiness of assent. He begins his article by providing the ra-
tionale for the doctrine of unconscionability through the recognition of 
a circle of assent118 that surrounds all contracts. Murray’s analysis be-
gins with how the circle of assent applies to form contracting and the 
invocation of Llewellyn’s bifurcation of assent into specific and blanket 
assent.119 For Llewellyn, written contract terms that are not connected 
to either form of assent are to be disregarded.120 
                                                                                                                     
 115. The evolution of form contracting as the most common form of contracting has 
been recognized. As to the dominance of form contracting, Korobkin states: 
More than thirty years ago, W. David Slawson estimated that 99 percent of all 
contracts did not resemble the Platonic ideal of a list of jointly negotiated terms 
but were instead presented by one party to the other on a pre-printed form. If 
anything, the dominance of form contracts over negotiated contracts has in-
creased in the intervening decades. The terms of mergers, joint ventures, and 
very large transactions are sometimes dickered, one at a time in the classic 
fashion, but nearly all commercial and consumer sales contracts are form 
driven. 
Korobkin, supra note 6, at 1203 (citing W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and 
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971)). The policing 
of standard form contracting has received much scholarly attention. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. 
Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
445, 489 (1994) (calling for an “expanded notion of unconscionability” to prevent “uneven 
exchanges”); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory 
of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1299 (1993) (claiming that con-
sumers should be bound only to the terms they know and understand); Todd D. Rakoff, 
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983) (arguing 
that form terms should be presumptively unenforceable); Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and 
Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 132 (1984) (proposing that contracts should be gov-
erned by default terms some of which may only be overcome when the disadvantaged party 
has given “intelligent and meaningful approval”); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of 
Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 
23 (1984) (recommending that the reasonable expectations of the parties be enforced).  
 116. See infra Part IV.D.1-2. 
 117. Murray, supra note 4. 
 118. Id. at 9, 12.  
 119. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1. 
 120. Murray, supra note 4, at 13-23. 
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 The problem for Murray is with Llewellyn’s concept of blanket as-
sent. Instead, he utilizes the concept of unexpected consent121 as a bet-
ter means to apply unconscionability to standard form terms. Uncon-
scionability should be applied where the risk allocated is unexpected 
and is one normally borne by the risk allocator. Professor Murray re-
fers to the conspicuousness requirement of section 2-316122 as a 
method for narrowing the reach of unexpected assent. But, in the end, 
he asserts that conspicuousness is merely evidence of assent.123 Con-
spicuousness is evidence of apparent assent but not true assent.124 The 
importance of conspicuousness (and of negotiation) in the unconscion-
ability determination is measured in the coding project.125 
 Because of the fact that a clause may be the product of apparent 
assent and not true assent, Murray argues that Leff ’ s bifurcation of 
unconscionability into procedural and substantive does “little but add 
more labels to the increasing number of substitutes for analysis.”126 
Ultimately, Murray states that substantive unconscionability is the 
primary aim of the unconscionability doctrine: “How does a court de-
cide whether the unexpected risk sought to be altered by the expres-
sion of the parties is either insignificant (not burdensome) on the one 
hand or ‘oppressive’ on the other?”127 Or is Murray merely substitut-
ing labels? The factors he utilizes to determine if a risk allocation 
was “unexpected” are those applied to determine unconscionability.128 
 Murray’s tripartite approach to unconscionability includes the no-
tions of materiality and verification. The first part dealing with ap-
parent assent, discussed above, determines the apparent allocation of 
risk. The second part focuses on the materiality of the risk being al-
located.129 It is necessary “to determine the gravity of the risk being 
allocated, for if there is no substantial burden imposed, there is no 
need to go beyond the terms of the writing.”130 Murray refers to the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts for the answer.131 Section 275 of the 
Restatement provides a number of factors to be used to determine the 
materiality of breach. Murray recites two of the factors: “What is the 
                                                                                                                     
 121. Id. at 28-34. 
 122. Section 2-316(2) requires that any disclaimer or modification of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability “must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be 
conspicuous . . . .” U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2005). 
 123. Murray, supra note 4, at 19. He later states, “A court should not rely exclusively 
upon conspicuousness as its guide . . . .” Id. at 22. 
 124. Id. at 21. 
 125. See infra Part IV.D.1-2, IV.E.1. 
 126. Murray, supra note 4, at 21. 
 127. Id. at 23. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 23-28. 
 130. Id. at 24. 
 131. Professor Murray also refers to the use of a “materiality” standard in section 2-
207 of the U.C.C. Id. at 7-8, 27. 
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extent of the hardship on the party seeking enforcement of the clause 
in the event the court refuses to enforce it?” and “Will the party 
against whom the clause is to operate still obtain the substantial 
benefit which he could have reasonably anticipated?”132 In theory, 
such a determination between material and nonmaterial is impor-
tant, but in practice, it begs the question. A clause that may seem 
immaterial at the time of contracting will always be material in the 
context of the subsequent lawsuit. The clause being attacked as un-
conscionable is generally the key to the outcome of the lawsuit or a 
claim of unconscionability would be irrelevant. Thus, the hardship to 
the party seeking its enforcement and the anticipated benefit to the 
party seeking its avoidance will necessarily be substantial. 
 The final part of Murray’s analytical framework is “verification of 
assent.”133 In the event that there is no evidence of apparent assent, 
then this final stage is irrelevant. However, in the case of apparent 
assent, this stage is triggered to determine if there was genuine as-
sent. He describes this element as when the disfavored party has 
knowingly consented to a material, “originally unexpected” (diver-
gent from the normal risk allocation) risk allocation.134 This is the 
area where the assuming party is aware of the clause, as in the case 
of conspicuous presentation of the term, but has no genuine choice or 
alternative but to accept. The clearest case would be the subject mat-
ter of the contract is an absolute necessity and there is no reasonable 
likelihood of the “buyer . . . procur[ing] the item from other sellers 
absent the clause.”135 The importance of consent to the application of 
unconscionability is analyzed in the final Part V’s discussion of con-
sent theory. 
C.   Other Issues: Legal Representation and Reformation 
 Other factors examined in the present coding project are the im-
portance of legal representation to the unconscionability decision, the 
prevalence of price unconscionability to see whether courts intervene 
to void or reform a contract due to excessive price, and the frequency 
of use of the remedy of reformation.136 The latter factor has been re-
                                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 25 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 275 cmt. (1932)). 
 133. Id. at 28-34. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 32. 
 136.  Recently, a Canadian court noted that representation by an attorney is a factor, 
but it is not dispositive in determining unconscionability: 
Although independent counsel is an important factor to consider in determin-
ing whether the parties voluntarily entered into the contract, absent other de-
fenses, it is insufficient to demonstrate a lack of voluntariness. However, if the 
party asserting procedural unconscionability was unable to meet with an at-
torney or if the advice was explained in an incomprehensible manner, the court 
may find the voluntariness element absent. 
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ferred to as “per se unconscionability.”137 This exists when the imbal-
ance in consideration is so severe as to be considered unconscionable 
on its face, as in the case of price gouging.138 
 Section 2-302 provides courts with the option of either voiding the 
unconscionable term or to reforming the term to make it reasonable. 
It establishes that courts “may enforce the remainder of the contract 
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application 
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable re-
sult.”139 This express statement indicates that the drafters intended 
reformation to be the favored remedy, especially in situations lacking 
profound procedural overreaching.140 The coding project measures the 
percentage of cases where courts have reformed an unconscionable 
clause or contract.141 
IV.   METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
 Section 2-302 recognized and codified the longstanding equitable 
doctrine of unconscionability although, it did little to provide a defi-
nition or a set of rules for analyzing claims under the doctrine.142 In 
order to better understand this doctrine as it is applied in practice, a 
systematic methodological approach based on the coding of a sample 
                                                                                                                     
Sikaitis, supra note 55, at 358 (footnotes omitted). 
 137. Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 789. 
 138. However, numerous states have adopted price gouging statutes to police this form 
of unconscionability. Eighteen states have antiprice-gouging statutes with sixteen trig-
gered by a declaration of a state of emergency or natural disaster. These states include 
New York and Florida. Under section 501.160, Florida Statutes, (2005) it is illegal to 
charge unconscionable prices for goods or services following a declared state of emergency. 
New York’s price gouging statute is similar. 
 139. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2005). 
 140. Professor Ellinghaus concluded: 
[A] court should probably begin with a bias in favor of “rewriting.” Where modi-
fication of the contract, by way of appropriate treatment of the unconscionable 
component, seems to be capable of working a measure of justice, it would seem 
unnecessarily and arbitrarily zealous on the part of the court to go further. The 
court should, in particular, be on guard against an inherited bias tending in the 
opposite direction, that is, against modification of the contract: Section 2-302 
clearly calls for a break with tradition in this respect, and it is more in accor-
dance with its mood and tenor to err here on the side of boldness than on that 
of caution. 
 Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 780. 
 141. See infra Part IV.D.1-2. 
 142. See supra note 4. This difficulty in defining unconscionability is analogous to the 
courts and commentators difficulty in defining obscenity. This difficulty is evidenced by the 
famous statement by the late Justice Potter Stewart in 1964. When faced with a case in-
volving obscenity, Justice Stewart stated in a concurring opinion, “I shall not today at-
tempt further to define [obscenity] . . . ; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly 
doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . .” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). This 
statement also illustrates the difficulty of trying to determine what constitutes an uncon-
scionable contract. Courts and respected commentators alike have grappled with defining 
and applying unconscionability under the U.C.C. since its adoption. 
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of cases has been employed. Cases were coded based upon a litany of 
specific unconscionability factors143 enumerated in case law and legal 
scholarship. Parts IV.A and IV.B describe the parameters and meth-
odology used in the case coding project. Part IV.A describes how the 
data was collected and explains the analytical tools used to analyze 
the data. Part IV.B explains the independent and dependent vari-
ables that were tested and the hypotheses posed. Part IV.C enumer-
ates fifteen hypotheses divided into two groups. The first group fo-
cuses upon the relative importance of the different procedural and 
substantive factors. The second group assesses changes between dif-
ferent time periods. Part IV.D reports the findings of the factor asso-
ciations enumerated in the hypotheses and suggests some conclu-
sions. Finally, Part IV.E presents the results of a regression analysis 
that shows the effect of the factors on one another. 
A.   Selection of Cases 
 Since the evolving nature of the law poses particular challenges 
for data analysis,144 the cases sampled were bifurcated into two dis-
tinct decision periods to test for changes over time. All cases for the 
years 1968 to 1980 and from 1991 to 2003 were sought where uncon-
scionability and U.C.C. section 2-302 were mentioned. A total of 101 
possible court decisions were located for the period 1968-1980 and 86 
possible court decisions were located from 1991-2003. 
 It is estimated that this reporting database publishes approxi-
mately 38% of all appellate decisions and 10-15% of all district court 
decisions.145 The individual courts of appeals decide which decisions 
are published based on perceived importance and precedential 
value.146 All published decisions since 1980 are included on 
WESTLAW. Thus, although this data base does not cover all courts 
of appeals decisions for the time period, the most important and rele-
vant cases have been included. The WESTLAW computer database 
was searched for the years 1968 to 1980 and from 1991 to 2003.147  
 Of the total of 187 federal court cases that were located for the pe-
riods 1968-1980 and from 1991-2003, 148 (80%) were included in the 
sample or data analysis. A few cases (n = 6) were from lower court 
                                                                                                                     
 143. See infra app. A (Unconscionability Coding Sheet). 
 144. See M.V. Roehling, Extracting Policy from Judicial Opinions: The Danger of Policy 
Capturing in a Field Setting, 46 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 477-502 (1993). 
 145. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publi-
cation in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 
(1981). 
 146. See MORRIS L. COHEN & ROBERT C. BERRING, FINDING THE LAW: AN ABRIDGED 
EDITION OF “HOW TO FIND THE LAW” (8th ed. 1983).  
 147. West Publishing Company publishes the Federal Reporter for U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals decisions and the Federal Supplement for U.S. District Court decisions.  
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decisions of identical appellate cases and, thus, were not included in 
the analysis. Additionally, a large number of discarded cases were 
those that were remanded back to the trial court (n = 17). However, 
in eleven of these decisions to vacate or remand, the appellate court 
provided guidance in the judicial opinion to the district court, thus, 
these eleven cases were included in the final analysis. The remaining 
cases that were discarded (n = 27) referred to unconscionability 
merely extraneously or tangentially. 
 The procedures used in examining the legal cases were similar to 
those employed in content analysis of secondary data sources.148 The 
basic steps in analyzing each case consisted of the following: (a) se-
lection of independent and dependent variables, (b) identification of 
coding procedures, and (c) classification of each case according to the 
coding procedure. Part IV.B explains the process used in the coding 
of the independent and dependent variables. 
B.   Independent and Dependent Variables 
 The review of articles and judicial opinions uncovered seventeen 
categorical independent variables that were then examined by this 
study to see their relationships and influence on court decisions (see 
Appendix A, “Coding Sheet”). These variables and their scoring in-
cluded the following: (1) the parties to the litigation (1 = consumer; 0 
= merchant); (2) parties represented by an attorney (1 = yes, 0 = no); 
(3) parties that were unsophisticated (1 = yes, 0 = no); (4) parties that 
were uneducated (1 = yes, 0 = no); (5) parties that were from low so-
cial economic status (1 = yes, 0 = no); (6) cases that involved a form 
contract (1 = yes, 0 = no); (7) clause was negotiated or conspicuous (1 
= yes, 0 = no); (8) excessive price or undue profits (1 = yes, 0 = no); (9) 
clause was grossly one-sided (1 = yes, 0 = no); (10) contract was for 
the sale of goods (1 = yes, 0 = no); (11) court found procedural uncon-
scionability (1 = yes, 0 = no); (12) court found substantive uncon-
scionability (1 = yes, 0 = no); (13) exculpatory, limitation of liability 
or remedy clause present (1 = yes, 0 = no); (14) warranty or dis-
claimer of warranty clause present (1 = yes, 0 = no); (15) court dis-
cussed other policing doctrines (fraud, misrepresentation, undue in-
fluence, good faith or fair dealing) (1 = yes, 0 = no); (16) clause was 
voided or rescinded (1 = yes, 0 = no); (17) contract was reformed (1 = 
yes, 0 = no). The dependent variable in the study was the decision 
reached by the court. A decision finding unconscionability was coded 
1, while a decision that did not find the contract unconscionable was 
coded 0.  
                                                                                                                     
 148. See OLE R. HOLSTI, CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND 
HUMANITIES (1969); Fred Kort, Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law, in 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 133-97 (B. Schubert ed., 1963). 
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 Information on the case characteristics was obtained from the 
published decision, which included factual background information 
on the case and the legal arguments put forth by the parties, as well 
as the court’s analysis and decision. Each independent variable was 
coded by observing if the written opinion noted specifically that a 
characteristic was or was not present. If the written opinion in the 
case did not mention a specific case characteristic, then data for that 
particular variable was treated as missing.  
 Using the coding procedures previously described, the cases were 
coded by two raters working independently. For the seventeen vari-
ables coded, the reliability, or index of agreement, among the raters 
was 93.2%. 
C.   Factor Association 
 To determine what factors contribute to a court’s decision in an un-
conscionability case, we posed numerous hypotheses to test. These hy-
potheses were divided into two groups. The first group statistically 
tested the factors on the aggregated data set (both time periods com-
bined). This aggregation allowed us to look at specific hypotheses with 
greater statistical power than if the cases were not aggregated. The 
second set of hypotheses specifically tested for statistical differences 
between the two timeframes selected. Group A hypotheses are those 
measured in the aggregate. Group B hypotheses measure intergenera-
tional change. Finally, a logistic regression analysis was performed to 
determine the global effects of the factors or variables when other fac-
tors were present in the fact patterns. In short, a logistic analysis 
shows whether the predictive power of a factor or variable is enhanced 
or diminished by the existence of another factor or factors. 
1.   Group A Hypotheses 
 The following list of hypotheses was formulated using the aggre-
gated data from all 148 cases. First, we tested the likelihood of being 
successful in a claim of unconscionability in general and when lodged 
by a merchant party. We also hypothesized what affects a form con-
tract, the presence of an attorney and whether the alleged uncon-
scionable term was negotiated or conspicuous would have on claims 
of unconscionability. Also of interest was the testing of the proce-
dural-substantive matrix made famous by Leff ’s seminal article,149 
along with the effects of other policing doctrines,150 and the fact that 
the challenged clause was one that typically results in heightened 
                                                                                                                     
 149. See supra note 62. 
 150. The policing doctrines tested for were fraud, misrepresentation, the duty of good 
faith, and “others.” See infra app. A.  In the “others” category, the policing doctrines of du-
ress, mistake, and undue influence were grouped. 
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scrutiny by the courts151 would have on claims of unconscionability. 
Finally, we were interested in testing the court’s paternalistic actions 
in cases involving unsophisticated/uneducated/low socio-economic 
status parties and the effects that excessive price or undue profits 
have on the court’s decisions in unconscionability cases. Formally 
stated, Hypotheses 1A to 12A are as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1A: Claims of unconscionability are difficult to win. 
 Hypothesis 2A: The number of decisions finding unconscionability 
in sales cases is small. 
 Hypothesis 3A: Merchants rarely win claims of unconscionability 
compared to consumers. 
 Hypothesis 4A: The likelihood that a successful unconscionability 
case involves a standard form contract is greater than that for a non-
standard form contract case.  
 Hypothesis 5A: Findings of unconscionability require both proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability. 
 Hypothesis 6A: A party represented by an attorney in the negotia-
tion or preparation of a contract rarely succeeds with an unconscion-
ability claim. 
 Hypothesis 7A: Unconscionability allegations rarely succeed in 
cases where the alleged unconscionable term was negotiated or con-
spicuous. 
 Hypothesis 8A: A substantial percentage of successful unconscion-
ability claims involve cases where another policing doctrine, such as 
fraud, misrepresentation, bad faith is also applied. 
 Hypothesis 9A: A substantial percentage of successful unconscion-
ability claims involves highly scrutinized clauses, such as limitation 
of liability, limitation of remedy, liquidated damages, penalty, attor-
ney fees, disclaimer, warranty or arbitration. 
 Hypothesis 10A: Unconscionable clauses or contracts are rarely re-
formed. 
 Hypothesis 11A: Decisions of unconscionability will be more likely 
when the case involves excessive price or undue profits. 
 Hypothesis 12A: Decisions of unconscionability will be more likely 
when the case involves an unsophisticated/uneducated/low socio-
economic status (SES) party. 
Also posed were three longitudinally-based hypotheses enumerated 
in the next section. 
                                                                                                                     
 151. The “high scrutiny clauses” tested for included limitation of remedy, limitation of 
liability, exculpatory, liquidated damages or penalty, attorney fees, warranty, disclaimer of 
warranty, and arbitration clauses. See infra app. A. 
1096  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1067 
 
2.   Group B Hypotheses 
 The following list of hypotheses was formulated by bifurcating the 
sample of cases into two periods: 1968-1980 and 1991-2003. First, we 
tested the likelihood that the success of unconscionability claims has 
increased from the first period to the second. Additionally, we were 
interested in the diffusion of the doctrine of unconscionability into 
nonsale-of-goods cases. Finally, we were interested in testing 
whether the courts have applied the doctrine of unconscionability 
more favorably to merchants from one period to the next. Formally 
stated Hypotheses 1B to 3B are as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1B: The rate of successful claims of unconscionability 
has increased over time. 
 Hypothesis 2B: The doctrine of unconscionability has increasingly 
been applied outside the law of sales. 
 Hypothesis 3B: The number of successful unconscionability claims 
brought by merchants has increased over time. 
The next part reports the statistical findings and whether the above 
hypotheses were supported. 
D.   Findings of Factor Association 
 Initial descriptive statistics demonstrate that overall, courts found 
an unconscionable contract in 37% (n = 56) of the cases sampled. Of 
these cases, forty contained both procedural and substantive ele-
ments of unconscionability. Substantive unconscionability was pre-
sent in 55 cases. In 41 cases, procedural unconscionability was pre-
sent. Also of interest was that only 30% of the 148 cases present (n = 
44) involved a contract for the sale of goods. Of these cases, the court 
found 36% (n = 16) to be unconscionable. Geographically, New York 
accounted for the largest percentage (23%) of cases (34 out of 148), 
while Connecticut and New Jersey followed with 11% and 8% of the 
cases respectively (16 and 12 out of 148). Overall, cases from 38 
states were represented in the sample.  
 A series of categorical logistic regression models (LOGIT)152 was 
used to fit the data using Proc Genmod in SAS®. LOGIT was chosen 
because each court decision was coded dichotomously. LOGIT models 
predict the likelihood for a particular category of a dichotomous vari-
able.153 In this case, we were predicting the likelihood that any given 
court would find a contract unconscionable.  
                                                                                                                     
 152. See generally MAURA E. STOKES ET AL., CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS USING THE 
SAS® SYSTEM (2d ed. 2000).  
 153. See generally ALAN AGRESTI, AN INTRODUCTION TO CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS 
(1996). 
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 In the first step of the analysis, a categorical logistic regression 
model was fit to the data to determine if decision year was related to 
the court’s decision. This was done to determine if our data could be 
aggregated across time periods and thus provide a larger sample to 
test for significant effects of the independent variables. A chi-square 
analysis154 revealed that collapsing across time periods was appropri-
ate (χ2 = 36.69, p = 0.01). Therefore, we aggregated the data into one 
time period to test for significant effects in group A hypotheses. 
1.   Group A Hypotheses: Results 
 Hypothesis 1A: Claims of unconscionability are difficult to win. 
 In order to determine if a claim of unconscionability is difficult to 
win, frequencies were calculated based on court findings of uncon-
scionability. Data revealed that in only 37.8% (56 out of 148) of the 
cases sampled unconscionability was found providing support for 
Hypothesis 1A. 
 Hypothesis 2A: The number of decisions finding unconscionability 
in sales cases is small. 
 The number of decisions finding unconscionability in a sale of 
goods contract was predicted to be small. Results of cross tabulations 
revealed that 30% (44 out of 148) of the cases involved the sale of 
goods. From these case 36% (16 out of 44) were found to be uncon-
scionable thus Hypothesis 2A was supported. 
 Hypothesis 3A: Merchants rarely win claims of unconscionability 
compared to consumers claims. 
 Hypothesis 3A posited that merchants rarely win claims of uncon-
scionability when compared to consumer claims. Individual cross 
tabulations were computed. Results of this analysis revealed that 
34% (50 out of 148) of the unconscionability claims sampled were 
brought by merchants. Out of these cases 16% (8 out of 50) were suc-
cessful. While 66% (98 out of 148) of the unconscionability claims 
sampled were brought by consumers. In 49% (48 out of 98) of these 
cases the consumer was successful in their unconsiciability claim, 
providing support for Hypothesis 3A. 
 Hypothesis 4A: The likelihood that a successful unconscionability 
case involves a standard form contract is greater than that for a non-
standard form contract.  
 In order to determine if there is a relationship between the court’s 
decision and the presence of a form contract, cross tabulations of the 
cases that indicated a form contract was used were calculated. Results 
revealed that in 71% (105 out of 148) of the cases sampled a form con-
tract was present. Additionally, in 43% (45 out of 105) of these form 
                                                                                                                     
 154. See generally STOKES ET AL., supra note 152.  
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contract cases the court subsequently ruled the contract was uncon-
scionable. Meanwhile, in cases where a form contract was not present 
the court ruled the contract was unconscionable only 27% (11 out of 
43) of the time.  This data provides support for Hypothesis 4A. 
 Hypothesis 5A: Findings of unconscionability require both proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability 
 In order to determine if the courts require both a procedural ele-
ment and a substantive element to find a contract unconscionable, 
cross tabulations of the cases were calculated that indicated that 
procedural unconscionability was present. Results revealed that in 
29% (43 out of 148) of the cases procedural unconscionability was 
present. From these cases the court ruled 95% (41 out of 43) of the 
time that the contract was unconscionable. Next, we calculated the 
cross tabulations for substantive unconscionability. Calculations in-
dicated that in 40% (59 out of 148) of the cases substantive uncon-
scionability was present. From these cases the court ruled 93% (55 
out of 59) of the time that the contract was unconscionable. To de-
termine if the courts require both a procedural element and a sub-
stantive element to find a contract unconscionable, we further statis-
tically analyzed the data. In the 43 cases where the court found pro-
cedural unconscionability existed substantive unconscionability was 
present in 95% (41 out of 43) of the cases. While in the 59 cases 
where substantive unconscionability was present, the court found 
procedural unconscionability present in 70% (41 out of 59). Based on 
these results, Hypothesis 5A is partially supported. More fully 
stated, where substantive unconscionability is found without a find-
ing of procedural unconscionability the contract is ultimately found 
to be unconscionable 100% (15 out of 15) of the time. Only in one in-
stance did the court rule that a contract was unconscionable after 
finding only procedural unconscionability present. 
 Hypothesis 6A: A party represented by an attorney in the negotia-
tion or preparation of a contract rarely succeeds with an unconscion-
ability claim. 
 Cross tabulations revealed that an attorney represented a party 
in precontractual negotiations 5.4% (8 out of 148) of the cases sam-
pled. In each of these eight cases the court did not find the contract 
unconscionable. Thus, Hypothesis 6A, which posited that a party 
represented by an attorney in the negotiation or preparation of a con-
tract rarely succeeds with an unconscionability claim, is supported. 
 Hypothesis 7A: Unconscionability allegations rarely succeed in 
cases where the alleged unconscionable term was negotiated or con-
spicuous. 
 Cross tabulations revealed that when an alleged unconscionable 
term was negotiated or conspicuous, the court found the term to be 
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unconscionable only 22.2% (8 out of 36) of the time. This finding was 
substantiated with a logistic analysis where the chi-square was sig-
nificant (χ2 = 4.72, p = 0.02). In cases where the alleged unconscion-
able term was negotiated or conspicuous, the estimated odds that the 
court would find the contract unconscionable is e-.97 or 0.37 times less 
likely than if the claim did not involve a negotiated or conspicuous 
unconscionable term in the contract. Thus, Hypothesis 7A, which 
posited that unconscionability allegations rarely succeed in cases 
where the alleged unconscionable term was negotiated or conspicu-
ous, is supported. 
 Hypothesis 8A: A substantial percentage of successful unconscion-
ability claims involve cases where another policing doctrine such as 
fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation is also applied. 
 Cross tabulations revealed that out of the 56 cases where the 
court found unconscionability existed, 43% (n = 24) of these case con-
tained fraud, mistake or misrepresentations suggesting, Hypothesis 
8A is supported.  
 Hypothesis 9A: A substantial percentage of successful unconscion-
ability claims involve highly scrutinized clauses such as limitation of 
liability, limitation of remedy, liquidated damage, penalty, attorney 
fee, disclaimer, warranty or arbitration. 
 Aggregative cross tabulations revealed that out of the 56 cases 
where the court found unconscionability existed, 52% (n = 29) of 
these cases contained either a(n) limitation of liability, limitation of 
remedy, liquidated damage, penalty, attorney fee, disclaimer, war-
ranty or arbitration clause, providing support for Hypothesis 9A. 
 Hypothesis 10A: Unconscionable clauses or contracts are rarely re-
formed. 
 Cross tabulations revealed that in the fifty-six cases where the 
court found the contract unconscionable, the unconscionable clause 
or contract was reformed only 7% (4 out of 56) of the time, suggesting 
Hypothesis 10A is supported. 
 Hypothesis 11A: Decisions of unconscionability will be more likely 
when the case involves excessive price or undue profits. 
 Cross tabulations revealed that in only 15% (22 out of 148) of the 
cases sampled did the court find excessive price or undue profits ex-
isted. Out of these 22 cases, the court ruled the contract was uncon-
scionable 77% (17 out of 22) of the time, suggesting Hypothesis 11A 
is supported. 
 Hypothesis 12A: Decisions of unconscionability will be more likely 
when the case involves an unsophisticated/uneducated/low socio-
economic status party. 
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 In order to determine if there is a relationship between the court’s 
decision and the presence of an unsophisticated/uneducated/low 
socio-economic status party, we calculated cross tabulations of the 
cases that indicated a party was of unsophisticated/uneducated/low 
socio-economic statuts status. Results revealed that in 85% (22 out of 
26) of the cases involving an unsophisticated/uneducated/low socio-
economic status party, the court found unconscionability, suggesting 
Hypothesis 12A is supported. 
2.   Group A Hypotheses: Conclusions 
 Results of our analysis revealed that unconscionability claims are 
difficult to win. As seen in Hypothesis 1A, only in 37.8% of the cases 
was a contract ruled unconscionable. Also of interest was the rela-
tively small percentage (30%) of cases actually involving a sale of 
goods contracts. Since we initially only coded whether a contract was 
or was not for the sale of goods, we performed a post hoc analysis of 
the data to determine what areas of law the unconscionability claims 
most frequently appeared. This post hoc analysis revealed that a 
large amount of cases arose from contracts for employment, real-
estate sales contracts, and service contracts. Hypothesis 3A, which 
posited that merchants rarely win claims of unconscionability, was 
supported despite there being no codification limitation on the appli-
cability of a claim of unconscionability in a merchant-to-merchant 
transaction. Results revealed that relatively few (n = 8) merchants’ 
unconscionability claims were upheld.  
 Generally, the results of testing hypotheses in Group A indicated 
that the use of a form contract increased the likelihood of the con-
tract being found unconscionable. While the presence of an attorney 
in precontract negotiations, or where the alleged unconscionable 
term was negotiated or conspicuous, diminishes the likelihood that 
the court will find a contract unconscionable. Interestingly, a statis-
tically significant number of cases (n = 15) did not require a showing 
of procedural unconscionability.  
3.   Group B Hypotheses: Results 
 Hypothesis 1B: The rate of successful claims of unconscionability 
has increased over time. 
 Hypothesis 1B posited that the rate of success of parties bringing 
unconscionability claims has increased over time. Individual cross 
tabulations were computed across time periods. Results of this analy-
sis revealed that for the period 1968 to 1980, 34% (24 out of 70) of the 
unconscionability claims were successful while 41% (32 out of 78) un-
conscionability claims were successful for the time period 1991 to 
2003. Although there was a slight increase (7%) in the percentage of 
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cases where unconscionbility was found between the two periods, this 
increase was not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 1B is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 2B: The doctrine of unconscionability has increasingly 
been applied outside the law of sales. 
 Hypothesis 2B posited that the doctrine of unconscionability has in-
creasingly been applied outside the law of sales. To test for the diffu-
sion of the section 2-302 unconscionability in ancillary areas of con-
tract law, cross tabulations were calculated of the cases that were 
coded as sale of goods transactions and those designated as nonsale 
cases. Results revealed that for the period 1968 to 1980, 54.3% (38 out 
of 78) of the unconscionability cases involved non-sale of goods con-
tracts, while 84.6% (66 out of 78) of the cases for time period 1991 to 
2003 involved non-sale of goods contracts. In order to determine 
whether this was a significant increase in the application of the U.C.C. 
to nonsale of goods cases, a logistic regression analysis was conducted. 
Results of this analysis indicated that year of decision was signifi-
cantly related (χ2 = 15.06, p < 0.01) to whether or not the case involved 
a sale of goods contract; thus, Hypothesis 2B is supported. 
 Hypothesis 3B: The number of successful unconscionability claims 
brought by merchants has increased over time. 
 Hypothesis 3B posited that the number of successful unconscion-
ability claims brought by merchants has increased over time. Indi-
vidual cross tabulations were computed across time periods. Results 
of this analysis revealed that for the period 1968 to 1980, 16% (4 out 
of 25) of the unconscionability claims brought by merchants were 
successful. The result was the same for the time period 1991 to 2003 
where 16% (4 out of 25) of the cases were successful. Therefore, Hy-
pothesis 3B is not supported. 
4.   Group B Hypotheses: Conclusions 
 Group B hypotheses tested for intergenerational changes among 
the cases for the two time periods. Hypothesis 2B posited that the doc-
trine of unconscionability has increasingly been applied outside the 
law of sales. This hypothesis was supported by a 30% increase in non-
sale unconscionability cases from 1968 to 1980 to the period of 1991 to 
2003.155 Results from Hypothesis 3B also revealed that merchants did 
not fair any better from the earlier to the later time periods. 
                                                                                                                     
 155. While the total number of unconscionability cases did rise from 70 to 78 (an 11% 
increase) from the first period to the second period, this increase was far less than the 30% 
increase of the nonsales cases. 
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E.   Results of Logistic Regression Analysis 
 Courts customarily designate more than one factor as relevant or 
important in their decision, rather than expounding a bright-line, 
single factor rule. Thus, several factors, rather than any one single 
factor, might explain the court’s finding of unconscionability. In fact, 
many factors are normally present simultaneously in a case and may 
have separate and/or simultaneous effects on the court’s decision. 
The presence of multiple factors may prevent or hinder legal scholars 
and practitioners from determining the “real” reason for the court’s 
decision. One could reason that as more and more factors are pre-
sent, the likelihood of the court finding a contract unconscionable 
will increase with each additional factor. In those cases where multi-
ple factors are present, all may have been necessary for the court to 
reach their decision without any one single factor being sufficient for 
the court’s decision. This proposition assumes, however, that all fac-
tors are given equal weight by the court. In reality, certain factors 
may be weighed differently by the courts. Thus, merely identifying 
factors in a case fails to take into consideration their relative influ-
ence on the court’s decision.  
 As we have shown above,156 by coding the presence or absence of 
certain factors in the case, we were able to determine the relative 
importance of each factor being present and the factor’s relationship 
to the court’s decision. However, to determine the relative impor-
tance of each factor individually when compared to all factors re-
quires the use of logistic regression.157 This analysis takes into con-
sideration all factors present in the case simultaneously with their 
respective influence or affect on the court’s decision. This type of sta-
tistical analysis responds to the fact that courts do not compute the 
presence or absence of factors in a vacuum or on a scorecard when 
reaching their decisions. Certain factors we posit may carry greater 
weight when compared to other factors, while some factors may be 
necessary but insufficient by themselves for a court to find a contract 
unconscionable. Courts often use a “factor analysis” or a multifactor 
balancing test when reaching their decisions.158  
                                                                                                                     
 156. See infra Part IV.D.1-4. 
 157. See supra notes 152-54. 
 158. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 416 (1984). The Su-
preme Court’s decision in this case is supported by a multifactor balancing test under the 
U.S. Copyright Act. The “fair use factors” to be considered under 17 U.S.C. § 107 are the 
following: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether it is commercial or 
noncommercial; (2) the nature of the work (e.g., factual works are entitled to less protec-
tion than creative works); (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion of the work 
used; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the work.  A court must 
weigh each factor in reference to the other factors in the case before arriving at its ruling.  
In contract law, the court in In re Antonelli provided this description of a factors analysis 
approach to rule application: “Application of the rule, however, calls for a particularized, 
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 In this Part we analyze the factors that were enunciated in the 
case coding project through logistic regression to determine what fac-
tors are significantly related to the court’s decision and also which 
factors have the greatest statistical influence on the court’s decision. 
The regression analysis models the factors that contribute to a 
court’s decision as to whether a contract was unconscionable.159  
1.   Logistic Regression 
 Logistic regression is a multiple regression technique that has an 
outcome variable that is a categorical dichotomy (0 or 1) and predictor 
variables that are continuous (1, 2, 3, . . . ) or categorical. More simply 
stated, logistic regression provides researchers with the ability to 
model or determine the influence of individual case factors by identify-
ing their relative weights or influence on the court’s dichotomist deci-
sion. In this instance, we are predicting the court’s decision that a con-
tract is unconscionable or not unconscionable while simultaneously 
controlling for the presence of multiple independent factors.  
 We started the logistic analysis by first hypothesizing the expected 
factors beta coefficient’s sign and their relationship with the court’s 
decision. Table 1 shows the number of cases in which the independent 
variable was present and the expected beta coefficient’s sign. We pre-
dicted positive coefficient signs for those variables that, when present 
in the case, increase the probability that the court will find the con-
tract unconscionable. Conversely, negative coefficient signs indicated 
that when the variable is present in the case the probability the court 
will find the contract unconscionable is decreased. 
                                                                                                                     
practical approach rather than a conceptual one to the assignment question.” 148 B.R. 443, 
448 (D. Md. 1992) (involving the issue of the assignability of a personal service contract). 
 159. Prior application of regression analysis in similar legal context has been used to 
explain and even predict judicial decisions. Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Le-
gal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 730 (1980), Jeffery A. Segal, Predicting Supreme 
Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981, 78 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 891 (1984). 
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TABLE 1 
LIST OF VARIABLES FOR LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
1 = CONTRACT FOUND UNCONSCIONABLE (56 CASES) 
0 = CONTRACT NOT FOUND UNCONSCIONABLE (92 CASES) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES EXPECTED SIGN NUMBER OF CASES 
1. Consumer Plaintiff + 98 
2. Merchant Plaintiff - 50 
3. Attorney Representation  - 8 
4. Party Was Unsophisticated + 26 
5. Party Was Uneducated + 21 
6. Party Was from Low SES + 20 
7. Form Contract + 105 
8. Clause Was Negotiated or Conspicuous - 36 
9. Excessive Price or Undue Profits + 22 
10. Grossly One-sided + 48 
11. Sale of Goods + 44 
12. Limitation of Liability + 43 
13. Liquidated Damages + 10 
14. Disclaimer of Warranty + 22 
15. Arbitration Clause + 16 
16. Other Policy Doctrines  + 54 
 Table 1 provides several insightful comparisons. First, the only 
hypothesized negative coefficient signs were the presence of an at-
torney, the plaintiff being a merchant, and a clause that was negoti-
ated or conspicuous. These variables were hypothesized to have 
negative coefficient signs since one would expect that if an attorney 
represented the plaintiff in precontractual negotiations, or if the 
clause was conspicuous, any unconscionable terms would be deleted 
from the contract,160 while the coefficient for merchant was hypothe-
sized to have a negative coefficient since courts have historically dis-
favored applying U.C.C. section 2-302 protection to merchants.161 
                                                                                                                     
 160. Previously, one of the authors studied the importance of the presence of legal rep-
resentation in the application of reliance theory to enforce precontractual agreements or 
comfort instruments. See Larry A. DiMatteo & René Sacasas, Credit and Value Comfort 
Instruments: Crossing the Line from Assurance to Legally Significant Reliance and Toward 
a Theory of Enforceability, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 357 (1995) (concluding that the existence of 
an attorney weighed in favor of a finding of contractual intent or reliance on informal 
business instruments). 
 161. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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 Correlations were then computed for all variables as shown in 
Appendix A. From the initial computation we noted high intercorre-
lations (r > 0.85) between the three variables of unsophisticated, un-
educated and low socio-economic status. This high intercorrelation is 
not surprising given the similar underlying conceptual and methodo-
logical relationship of these three variables.162 To reduce the effects of 
multicollinearity,163 which reduces the overall size of the test statistic 
and thereby lowers reported significance levels, we collapsed the 
three independent variables (unsophisticated, uneducated and low 
socio-economic status) into one variable named sophistication. This 
new composite variable, not surprising given the paternalistic ap-
proach of the courts, was significantly correlated with the court deci-
sions (r = .40, p< 0.001). Also of interest was the very significant rela-
tionship between the presence of a one-sided contract and the finding 
of unconscionability (r = 0.80). Excessive price and the presence of 
consumers as a party were also significantly related to the finding of 
unconscionability (r = 0.34 and .32, p < 0.001 respectively). 
2.   Logistic Regression Results 
 To reduce the effects of multicollinearity and to prevent the 
LOGIT regression model from not converging,164 we chose to exclude 
from the analysis those factors that did not have a significant first 
order correlation with the court’s decision.165 The LOGIT regression 
model contained the following factors: parties, form contract, negoti-
ated or conspicuous clause, excessive price, exculpatory clause, arbi-
tration clause, sale of goods, sophistication, and one sidedness. These 
remaining nine variables produced a model that fit the data and sig-
nificantly predicted judicial decisions (χ2 = 122.52, p < 0.000).  
 The logistic regression results appear in Table 2. 
                                                                                                                     
 162. JASON A. COLQUITT & JOHN C. SHAW, How Should Organizational Justice Be 
Measured?, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 113-52 (J. Greenberg & J.A. 
Colquitt eds., 2005).  Correlations greater than 0.70 should be aggregated since the indi-
vidual dimensions are indicators of the same underlying construct. 
 163. See generally DONALD P. SCHWAB, RESEARCH METHODS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL 
STUDIES ch. 18 (2d ed. 2005). 
 164. See supra notes 152-54. 
 165. See generally JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION 
ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2003). Excluded from the LOGIT regression 
model were the following factors: attorney, policing doctrines, fraud, good faith, liquidated 
damage and disclaimer. 
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TABLE 2 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE: FINDING OF UNCONSCIONABILITY 
FACTORS BETA WALD SIGNIFICANCE EXP(BETA) 
Parties 1.68 4.23 0.04 5.40 
Form Contract 0.97 1.38 0.23 2.65 
Negotiated or Conspicuous 0.23 .09 0.75 1.26 
Excessive Price 1.60 2.86 0.09 4.95 
Exculpatory 1.26 3.18 0.07 3.53 
Arbitration 0.44 0.14 0.70 1.55 
Sale of Goods 0.27 0.16 0.68 1.31 
Sophistication 0.63 4.66 0.03 1.88 
One-Sided 4.54 29.59 0.00 93.74 
Constant  -5.27 17.46 0.00 0.00 
 Confirming our hypothesized coefficient direction, all variables in 
the model had positive coefficient signs. The factors of parties, so-
phistication, and one-sided contract were significant predictors (p < 
0.05) of the court’s decision. In order to interpret the coefficients in a 
logistic regression, all betas must be transformed into odds ratios by 
taking the exponential log of β. Thus, the odds ratios of 93.74 for a 
one-sided contract indicates that when a contract is found to be one-
sided, the odds of the court finding a contract to be unconscionable 
was 93.74 times more likely than if the contract was not one-sided. 
Similarly, when the parties are found to be unsophisticated, the 
court rules the contract unconscionable 1.89 times more likely than 
when the parties are not found to be unsophisticated. Additionally, 
when the parties are consumers, the court finds a contract or con-
tract term unconscionable at a rate of 5.4 times more likely than 
when the parties are merchants. Excessive price and the presence of 
an exculpatory clause were also significantly related (p < 0.10) to the 
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court’s decision. The odds of the court finding a case unconscionable 
when an excessive price was paid was five times more likely than if 
an excessive price was not present, while the presence of an exculpa-
tory clause increased the odds of the court finding the contract un-
conscionable by 3.5 times.  
 Similar to the cross tabulations reported earlier in this Part, the 
logistic regression statistically confirmed that courts take a paternal-
istic approach when deciding unconscionablity cases. The beta esti-
mates indicate that the plaintiffs were more likely to win their cases 
when (a) an unsophisticated party was involved, (b) the parties were 
consumers, (c) the contract was one-sided, (d) the contract was for an 
excessive price, and (e) the contract contained an exculpatory clause. 
Interestingly, no procedural unconscionability factors were signifi-
cantly related to the court’s decision. Thus, substantive unconscion-
ability which examines the relative fairness of the obligations as-
sumed166 can alone support an unconscionability claim.  
V.   A THEORY OF CONSENT APPROACH TO UNCONSCIONABILITY 
 The results of the coding project showed that the notion of true as-
sent,167 despite the dominant role of apparent assent in the objective 
theory of contracts,168 remains an overriding consideration in uncon-
scionability cases. Part V.A that follows briefly explores consent the-
ory. Part  V.B then borrows from consent theory in offering a consent 
theory approach to unconscionability. This approach is premised upon 
the conclusion that the factors analyzed in the case coding project are 
divisible into consent-questioning and consent-enhancing factors.  
A.   Consent Theory 
 In The Bargain Principle and Its Limits,169 Professor Eisenberg 
provides the case for a doctrine of unfair persuasion within the prin-
ciple of unconscionability.170 He proposes that strict enforcement of 
                                                                                                                     
 166. Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). 
 167. It is important to make clear that “true assent” is not necessarily subjective or ac-
tual assent. It can be understood as simply broadening the interpretative viewfinder of the 
objective theory of contracts to include additional types of contextual evidence. It is a 
search for a truer form of objective or apparent assent. 
 168. See generally LARRY A. DIMATTEO, CONTRACT THEORY: THE EVOLUTION OF 
CONTRACTUAL INTENT (1998) (providing a historical and philosophical analysis of the sub-
jective and objective theories of contract interpretation). 
 169. Melvin Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 
(1982). 
 170. Although akin to the common law doctrine of undue influence, his proposed doc-
trine of undue surprise would not require a confidential relationship. He states that 
“[u]ndue influence, which might otherwise seem in point, traditionally requires a preexist-
ing relationship between the parties.” Id. at 774. A doctrine of undue persuasion would “be 
a defense to a bargain promise whether or not the parties had a preexisting relationship.” 
Id. at 774-75. 
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bargain promises should be limited in cases of unfair persuasion, 
which is a subset of cases within his examination of the principle of 
unconscionability, whose defining characteristic is the utilization of 
bargaining methods that produce a state of acquiescence.171 The state 
of acquiescence is a transitory state172 either fostered by the bargain-
ing method or one for which the bargaining method takes advantage. 
In this transitory state, the weakened party is incapable of acting in 
her normal deliberate manner.173 This is a recognition of the diver-
gence between the bargain principle as generally applied in contract 
law to what is needed for truly free bargaining in practice. In short, 
the former recognizes the contract as a product of bargain which re-
quires the strict enforcement of the contract’s terms, while the latter 
broadens the view of bargain from the narrow exchange of considera-
tion to agreements whose terms are the product of free or deliberate 
bargaining. Alternatively stated, the apparent assent of bargain is 
limited by the recognition of a lack of true or actual assent. 
 The court in Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes174 explains that 
“[t]he intent of the clause [Section 2-302] is not to erase the doctrine 
of freedom of contract, but to make realistic the assumption of the 
law that the agreement has resulted from real bargaining between 
parties who had freedom of choice and understanding and ability to 
negotiate in a meaningful fashion.”175 For this court, real bargaining 
is premised upon understanding and negotiation. The existence of ac-
tual knowledge of the term through disclosure, best achieved through 
negotiation, implies real or true consent.  
 Randy Barnett’s consent theory approach176 to contractual obliga-
tion is helpful to understanding the underlying rationale motivating 
judicial decisionmaking in unconscionability cases—the search for 
“truer consent.”177 “[A] consent theory specifies that a promisor incurs 
a contractual obligation the legal enforcement of which is morally 
justifiable by manifesting assent to legal enforcement and thereby 
invoking the institution of contract.”178 Barnett concludes that “[t]he 
basis of contractual obligation is not promising per se [but] . . . con-
                                                                                                                     
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 773. 
 174. 800 A.2d 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002). 
 175. Id. at 922 (emphasis added) (quoting Judge Francis’ opinion in Kugler v. Romain, 
279 A.2d 640, 651-52 (N.J. 1971)). 
 176. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) 
[hereinafter Barnett, Consent Theory]; Randy E. Barnett, . . . And Contractual Consent, 3 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 421 (1993); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules 
and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992).  
 177. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 176. 
 178. Id. at 305. 
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sent.”179 Professor Blake Morant offers this succinct statement of con-
sent theory: 
Appreciation of the limitations of objective assent presupposes that 
individuals are not compelled to honor obligations that were not 
willingly assumed. This is the essence of a consent theory of con-
tract, which does not recognize objective manifestations as disposi-
tive of assent. While an objective approach to the determination of 
consent is probative, consent theory seeks confirmation of the real-
ity of that assent. In the best case scenario, only true consent sub-
stantiates enforcement of obligations specified in the agreement. 
    Consent theory represents a moral and realist refinement of the 
freedom of contract notion. Parties may bargain freely; however, 
the objective manifestations of their assent may require greater 
verification. True contract validity rests with the establishment of 
real or palpable assent. Thus, objective manifestations, such as a 
signature on a form, may not constitute the genuine assent neces-
sary to justify enforcement.180 
Jean Braucher asserts that contract law inevitably plays a regulatory 
role and as such “[e]nforcement of contractual obligation requires ex-
ternal normative definition.”181 Acknowledging the central role that 
consent plays in contract law she then admonishes that contract law 
also must set “appropriate limits of consent as a rationale for contract 
enforcement, particularly for enforcement of very harsh terms.”182 
Braucher suggests that the status quo distribution of wealth and 
knowledge is a reflection of an “imperfect world”183 and that imperfect 
world limits the free exercise of consent. Thus, the relative “wealth, 
power, knowledge, and judgment”184 of contracting parties provide the 
grounds for inquiry into the validity of their apparent consent.185 These 
insights of consent theory will be used in the next section to fashion 
the framework for a consent theory of unconscionability.  
                                                                                                                     
 179. Id. 
 180. Blake Morant, Critical Legal Studies (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thors). For a critique of Barnett’s “libertarian consent theory of contract,” see Jean 
Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990).  
 181. Braucher, supra note 180, at 712. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 713. Because of the unjust distributions of entitlement, “consent is at best a 
relative justification for contract enforcement, not an absolute one.” Id. 
 184. Id. at 712-13. 
 185. Braucher describes the common law’s invalidity doctrines (duress, undue influence, 
mistake, capacity and misrepresentation) as directed toward the divergence of apparent con-
sent with actual consent. Regarding unconscionability, she states that “[u]nconscionability 
can be understood as a residual invalidity category.” Id. at 713. 
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B.   A Consent Theory of Unconscionability 
 The courts’ recognition and use of the factors tested in the coding 
project can best be understood as a search for truer assent than the 
objective first order consent represented by the signed contract. The 
question then becomes whether the consent search is a search for the 
apparent assent of the objective theory of contracts or something 
more?186 The answer is that it is an objective search for a truer form 
of apparent assent. The importance of conspicuousness187 indicates 
that the appearance of consent, such as knowledge or the appearance 
of knowledge, is an important force in judicial decisionmaking in this 
area of law. However, there is also a recognition, given the impor-
tance of factors, such as level education and sophistication,188 the 
merchant-consumer distinction,189 existence of other policing doc-
trines,190 that the appearance of knowledge does not equate to under-
standing or subjective consent.  
 The divergence between the appearance of knowledge and actual 
knowledge is illustrated by Professor Speidel’s “circle of assent.”191 
The circle of assent is bifurcated into “apparent consent” and “real 
consent.”192 Apparent consent is best illustrated by the technique of 
disclosure, and real consent is exemplified by the element of choice.193 
Both are aligned with procedural unconscionability. The case coding 
project proved that the existence of procedural elements of disclo-
sure, or knowledge and choice,194 will almost always insulate a con-
tract from a claim of unconscionability. However, even if both ele-
ments of consent are present, the needs of consumer protection still 
dictate judicial intervention in clearly unconscionable contracts. This 
consent plus paternalism is seen at work when courts intervene to 
                                                                                                                     
 186. For Barnett it is something more. “In a consent theory, then, contracts are inter-
preted with an eye towards honoring the actual intentions of the parties.” Barnett, Consent 
Theory, supra note 176, at 306-07. 
 187. See supra Part IV.D.1 (Hypothesis 7A). 
 188. Id. (Hypothesis 12A). 
 189. Id. (Hypothesis 3A). 
 190. Id. (Hypothesis 8A). 
 191. Speidel, supra note 63, at 362 (discussing Professor Murray’s template for apply-
ing unconscionability); see Murray, supra note 4. 
 192. Speidel, supra note 63, at 362. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Speidel’s analysis is specifically focused toward the consumer buyer. He offers a 
tripartite test to determine the existence of choice or real assent:  
  [T]he concept of real assent apparently involves three questions: (1) Could 
the consumer, by reasonable efforts at comparative shopping, have found simi-
lar goods in a relevant market area without the objectionable clause? (2) If not, 
is the subject of the contract a frill or a necessity? [If a frill, then the decision to 
purchase is a matter of choice.] (3) If a necessity, however, the last inquiry 
seems to be whether the professional can justify the term as commercially rea-
sonable. 
Id. at 361-62. 
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police covenants not-to-compete, antiassignment lease provisions, 
and liquidated damages clauses. In these areas, courts generally 
make no distinction between boilerplate and fully-negotiated clauses. 
For example, a fully-negotiated penalty (liquidated damages) clause 
between equally sophisticated parties is just as unenforceable as one 
in an adhesion contract between parties of highly unequal bargaining 
power. A penalty is simply unenforceable.195  
 Even if substantial fairness is the underlying philosophy for the 
unconscionability doctrine, consent, namely real, meaningful con-
sent, remains the foundation of contractual obligation. Substantive 
unconscionability is the surrogate for the theme that contract law as 
a regulatory device needs to ensure at least a minimum level of fair-
ness in the exchange. Procedural unconscionability is the champion 
of the dominant autonomy theme of contract law. Consent is the hu-
man vehicle for exercising freedom or autonomy. As such, it must be 
incorporated into the application of any limiting or policing doctrine 
such as unconscionability. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that 
factors connected to the finding of a truer consent, then that simply 
represented by a signed contract, have a high predictive power in un-
conscionability decisions. 
 The importance of consent-enhancing factors explains the predic-
tive power of factors such as conspicuousness,196 negotiations,197 and 
the existence of legal counsel198 in the unconscionability decision. The 
existence of substantial evidence of a number of the consent-
questioning factors can be nullified or counteracted by the existence of 
consent-enhancing factors.199 Thus, when challenged terms were the 
product of negotiations, conspicuously presented (or brought to the at-
tention of the challenging party), or where the challenging party was 
represented by legal counsel at the time of formation, the existence of 
                                                                                                                     
 195. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2005). 
 196. See supra Part IV.D.1-2. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. One of the boldest examples of a court focusing on a single consent-enhancing fac-
tor was delivered in Bd. of Ed. of Berkeley County v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439 
(W. Va. 1977). The case involved the enforceability of an arbitration clause. The court pro-
nounced a new rule in which all disputes would be subject to arbitration if the arbitration 
clause was the product of negotiation. “The important words in the new rule are that the 
agreement to arbitrate must have been ‘bargained for.’ ” Id. at 447. The court, however, 
narrowly defined “bargained for” as cases not involving a contract of adhesion, when arbi-
tration is inappropriate given the nature of the contract, and when it is deemed to be un-
conscionable pursuant to section 2-302. Id. Thus, the new rule begs the question regarding 
the application of section 2-302. However, the court then clarified the importance of the 
bargained for requirement in relationship to section 2-302: “Whenever a party can bring an 
arbitration clause within the unconscionability provisions of § 2-302 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code . . . then that, too, would indicate that there was no meaningful bargaining 
with regard to the arbitration provision and should invalidate it.” Id. (emphasis added) (ci-
tations omitted). 
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consent-questioning factors (for example, merchant-consumer transac-
tion) is often trumped. The consent-enhancing factors support the be-
lief that the apparent consent of the written contract is a reliable sur-
rogate of actual assent. On the other hand, the existence of consent-
questioning factors (lack of sophistication, low level of education, low 
socio-economic status, etc.) will often show that the apparent consent 
represented by the written contract does not reflect the actual under-
standing or consent of the challenging party.  
 Much like other policing doctrines, such as duress, undue influ-
ence and mistake, the doctrine of unconscionability can be viewed as 
the court’s reexamination of the genuineness of the assent. A consent 
theory of unconscionability best explains the jurisprudence that has 
developed since the adoption of section 2-302 of the U.C.C. An over-
reaching clause will not be viewed as unconscionable if there is evi-
dence of knowing consent. Evidence of superconscionability or what 
Arthur Leff referred to as “super-assent,”200 such as clear disclosure 
(written and/or oral), negotiation, or express “signing off,”201 bolsters 
the case for actual or knowing consent. The notion of particularized 
or deliberative consent in the bargaining phase will generally insu-
late a one-sided clause from a claim of unconscionability. Cases that 
focused on evidence that the challenged clause was conspicuous, ei-
ther by way of its presentation in the contract or by notification by 
the clause-benefiting party, or that the clause itself was a product of 
negotiation or was part of the menu of terms that were subject to ne-
gotiation, or that the party challenging the clause or contract was 
represented by an attorney at the time of formation, overwhelmingly 
failed to find unconscionability. Cases in which there was some evi-
dence of negotiation or conspicuousness relating to the challenged 
clause had only a 22% success rate for unconscionability claims.202 
Only 5.4% of the cases acknowledged the existence of legal counsel at 
the time of formation and none were successful.203 However, in all of 
those cases the party challenging the clause failed on its unconscion-
ability claim. In addition, the success rate is appreciably higher for 
challenged clauses in standard form contracts (42.9%) than for 
clauses found in custom or nonstandard form contracts. This is likely 
due to the fact that the level of negotiation and the level of conspic-
                                                                                                                     
 200. The concept of superconscionability is not a novel one. Arthur Leff in a 1970 arti-
cle wrote of “super-disclosure” and “super-assent” that “one can imagine instances of some 
sort of super-disclosure by a seller, coupled with some sort of super-assent by a consumer, 
which might validate an otherwise ‘unconscionable’ provision.” Arthur Allen Leff, Uncon-
scionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 349, 349-50 (1970). 
 201. “Signing off ”  refers to the technique of having a party sign or initial clauses that 
the other party wants to insulate from future charges of unconscionability. 
 202. See supra Part IV.D.1-2. 
 203. Id. 
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uousness is lower in standard form contracting than in nonstandard 
form contracting. 
 Another indicator that supports a consent theory of unconscion-
ability includes the high degree of the existence of other policing doc-
trines (47%) in successful unconscionability cases.204 The fact that 
almost half of the successful unconscionability cases also discussed 
other policing doctrines is significant. The doctrines of fraud, misrep-
resentation, mistake, and undue influence all involve the element of 
genuineness of consent. The fact that true consent is an element dis-
cussed in the fact patterns of these cases supports the finding that 
the underlying factor in the courts’ analysis is consent-based.  
 The higher success rates for specific types of clauses, such as arbi-
tration clauses (75%), liquidated damages clauses (60%), limitation of 
liability or remedy clauses (51%), and disclaimer or warranty clauses 
(41%), as compared to an overall success rate for unconscionability 
claims of 37.8%, works against a consent theory of unconscionabil-
ity.205 Much like the law on covenants not-to-compete,206 the fact that 
the parties consented to the particular clause is largely irrelevant. 
These types of clauses are part of a list of highly scrutinized clauses 
that courts have traditionally policed under the rubric of public pol-
icy. These clauses are policed due to their inherent substantive 
naughtiness. A consent theory, however, can still be sustained by the 
fact that these particular clauses have been historically or statuto-
rily207 disenfranchised from the rubric of freedom of contract enforce-
ability. Therefore, the cases involving these types of clauses are 
really not true unconscionability cases. A separate body of jurispru-
dence is being utilized to void or reform these clauses. The fact that 
the clauses are or are not unconscionable is beside the point. For ex-
ample, an overly broad covenant not-to-compete will be reformed 
                                                                                                                     
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See generally T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompeti-
tion Cases, AM. BUS. L.J. (2006) (forthcoming) (on file with author) (discussing the role of 
equitable principles in the enforcement between competitors of employee noncompetition 
agreements); Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A 
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 
80 OR. L. REV. 1163 (2001) (discussing the role of corporate scandals and the problem of 
“brain drain” in the enforcement of such covenants); Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agree-
ments Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 629-31 (1960) (tracing the general enforce-
ability of covenants not-to-compete to the 18th century); Samuel C. Damren, The Theory of 
“Involuntary” Contracts: The Judicial Rewriting of Unreasonable Covenants Not to Com-
pete, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 71 (1999) (analyzing cases involving judicial revision); 
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon 
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999) (discussing 
the economic incentives of employers to continue requiring such agreements); see also Fre-
derick E. Hines, Employees’ Covenants Not to Solicit Former Patrons, 20 CAL. L. REV. 607 
(1932) (discussing the associated nonsolicitation agreement). 
 207. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-718, -719 (liquidated damages and limitation of remedy clauses). 
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even in cases of super-procedural conscionability because of the pol-
icy against restraints of competition.208 Liquidated damages clauses 
are often voided due to the policy against punitive or super-
compensatory damages in contract law.209 The fact that the parties 
negotiated the clauses is irrelevant.210 
 The low rate of reformation (7%) can also be seen as supporting a 
consent theory of unconscionability. As previously discussed, section 
2-302 emphasizes the remedy of reformation in addressing uncon-
scionable clauses or contracts.211 The rationale would seem to be that 
since the parties inserted the clause in their contract they, at some 
level, intended that the issue addressed by the clause be covered by 
the contract. For example, if the parties’ contract included a con-
spicuously presented per diem liquidated damages or penalty clause, 
then the objective theory of contract would hold that such a clause is 
reflective of contractual intent.212 Therefore, instead of voiding the 
clause, a rewriting of the clause to be conscionable would be truer to 
contractual intent. The fact that few unconscionable clauses are re-
formed reflects the courts’ belief that such clauses or contracts do not 
possess even a modicum of consent. 
 In the end, as in all forms of litigation, the success of a claim of 
unconscionability is dependent upon evidentiary matters. The desig-
nation of factors as consent-enhancing and consent-questioning aids 
in properly apportioning such matters of evidential burdens of proof. 
The party claiming unconscionability should bear the burden of prov-
ing the existence of sufficient consent-questioning factors. The party 
asserting the enforceability of the challenged clause or contract has 
the burden in rebutting the claim of unconscionability by proving the 
existence of countervailing procedural-based, consent-enhancing fac-
tors. The clause or contract defending party, especially in a mer-
chant-consumer transaction, should also bear the burden of proving 
                                                                                                                     
 208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 186, 188 (1979) (“A promise is unenforce-
able on grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of trade.”). A restriction is 
unreasonably in restraint of trade if “the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the 
promisee’s legitimate interest.” Id. § 188(1)(a). 
 209. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of 
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633 (2001) (reviewing the law of liquidated damages). 
 210. Other examples include antiassignment clauses in real property leases and excul-
patory clauses. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d. 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (ex-
plaining that leases are presumed to be assignable unless the landlord gives a commer-
cially reasonable reason for withholding consent); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 
P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985) (en banc). See generally Murray S. Levin, Withholding Consent to As-
signment: The Changing Rights of the Commercial Landlord, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 109 
(1980) (“ ‘[A] landlord may not unreasonably and capriciously withhold his consent.’ ” 
(quoting Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035, 1038 (Ala. 1977))). 
 211. See supra Part IV.D.1-2. 
 212. See generally DIMATTEO, supra note 168; Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of 
Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. 
REV. 293, 329-31 (1997). 
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the substantive reasonableness of the challenged clause when the 
balancing of consent-enhancing and consent-questioning factors is 
indeterminate.213 It is this battle over the finding of a truer form of 
apparent consent that best explains the law of unconscionability as 
applied under the rubric of section 2-302. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Since the codification of the unconscionability principle in section-
2-302, questions have persisted as to its meaning and the rationality 
of its application. This Article reported the findings of a case coding 
project of unconscionability cases taken from two different time peri-
ods. This allowed for the measuring of factors in the aggregate and 
intergenerationally. The findings presented confirmed a number of 
widely held assumptions. The findings support the hypothesis that it 
is very difficult for a merchant to succeed in an unconscionability 
claim. It also confirmed the importance of section 2-302 methodology 
to the common law of contracts. The importance of factors such as 
the use of standard forms and the level of education, sophistication, 
and socio-economic status of the challenging party was confirmed. In 
addition, the rarity of use by the courts of the remedy of reformation 
was confirmed. Finally, the success rate of unconscionability claims 
has remained remarkably stable over the past three to four decades. 
 The findings also showed that about half or more of all unconscion-
ability cases may not be “true” unconscionability cases. A significant 
number of cases had other principles of law or public policy at stake 
other than the principle of unconscionability. These included cases in-
volving other policing doctrines such as mistake, misrepresentation, 
fraud, undue influence, and bad faith, and cases involving highly-
scrutinized types of clauses such as exculpatory, arbitration, limitation 
of liability or remedies, liquidated damages, warranty or disclaimer of 
warranty. In these cases there were other bodies of jurisprudence or 
doctrines available to the courts in rendering their decisions. 
 The findings of the case coding project supports a consent theory 
of unconscionability as the best means to understand the case law. 
The types of factors utilized by the courts in making unconscionabil-
ity determinations are separable into consent-questioning and con-
sent-enhancing factors. The existence of standard forms, other polic-
ing doctrines, levels of education and sophistication provided the 
avenue for courts to question the true consent of the parties relating 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Professor Spiedel previously argued for this allocation of the substantive burden 
of proof: “[T]he professional [merchant] should have the burden of establishing the com-
mercial reasonableness of the disputed term.” Editors, Unconscionability: An Attempt at 
Definition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 333, 335 (1970) (summarizing Spiedel’s position by law re-
view editors). 
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to the challenged clause or contract. Other factors, such as represen-
tation by legal counsel, conspicuousness, and negotiations, enhanced 
the courts propensity to find that the apparent consent represented 
by the written contract was indeed a reflection of the true under-
standing of the parties.  
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APPENDIX A 
UNCONSCIONABILITY CODING SHEET 
 
Case Number________  Jurisdiction____________  State__________  Year________ 
1. Court Found Unconscionability (circle one):  Yes   No  Case Remanded W/O Finding 
2. Parties (circle one):  Consumer          Merchant 
3. Did the court find Procedural Unconscionability? (circle one): Yes     No 
• Did the court discuss procedural unconscionability? (circle one): Yes     No 
• Did case involve a Form Contract (circle one): Yes     No 
• Was the clause being challenged negotiated or conspicuous? Yes     No 
4. Consumer Was: 
• Unsophisticated (circle one): Yes     No 
• Uneducated (circle one): Yes     No 
• Low SES (circle one): Yes     No 
5. Parties Represented By Attorney (circle one): Yes     No 
6. Evidence Of Other Doctrines Presented: 
• Did the court discuss other “policing doctrines”? (circle one): Yes     No 
• Fraud or misrepresentation (circle one): Yes     No 
• Did the court discuss good faith and/or fair dealing? (circle one): Yes  No 
7. Substantive Unconscionability Present (circle one): Yes     No 
• Did the court discuss substantive unconscionability? Yes     No 
• Excessive Price or undue profits (circle one): Yes     No   
• Clause was considered grossly one-sided? Yes     No 
8. Additional Clauses Present: 
• Exculpatory, Limitation of Liability, or Limitation of Remedy (circle one): Yes     No 
• Liquidated Damage, Penalty Clause, or Attorney Fee Clause Yes   No 
• Disclaimer or Warranty Clause (circle one): Yes     No  
• Arbitration Clause (circle one): Yes     No 
9. Result: 
• Clause Voided/Rescission (circle one): Yes     No 
• Contract Reformed (circle one): Yes     No  
10. Type of Contract 
• Was this a sale of goods transaction? (circle one): Yes     No 
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